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This study contains the valuation of Netflix, Inc. elaborated in accordance with the Lisbon School of 
Economics & Management´s (ISEG) Finance Master´s Final Work Project. Our research is issued 
considering the public available information on Netflix, Inc. on October 15th, 2016. Thus, the report 
does not consider any events or circumstances which have arisen after this date. The study was 
elaborated recurring to the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) Approach. The assumptions considered 
to conduct this work were the result of a historical data analysis publicly disclosed by the company. 
The final recommendation for Netflix, Inc. stands for ‘Buy’, with a price target of USD 125.57 for 
2016YE, corresponding to an upside potential of +23.8% when compared to the closing price on 




Este estudo contém a avaliação da Netflix, Inc., elaborado em conformidade com o Trabalho Final 
do Programa de Mestrado em Finanças do Insituto Superior de Economia e Gestão (ISEG). Esta 
pesquisa é emitida tendo em conta a informação pública disponível em 15 de Outubro de 2016. 
Assim, o relatório não considera quaisquer eventos ou circunstâncias que surgiram após esta data. 
O estudo foi elaborado através do método dos Fluxos de Caixa Descontados (DCF). Os 
pressupostos considerados para realização deste trabalho foram o resultado de uma análise de 
dados históricos divulgada publicamente pela empresa. A recomendação final para Netflix, Inc. é 
de 'Comprar', com um preço-alvo de USD 125,57 para 2016YE, correspondendo a um ganho 
potencial de +23.8% aquando comparado com o preço de fecho a 14 de Outubro de 2016 de USD 
101,47. 
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We issue a Buy recommendation for Netflix Inc. with a price target of 
USD 125.57 for 2016YE. Having a high-risk profile based on the fierce 
competition the company faces as well as the degree of dependence 
on its international activities, our price target registers an upside 
potential of +23.8% compared to the closing price on 14th October 
2016 of USD 101.47. 
► Massive international acceptance and domestic consolidation 
In 2015, the company managed to attract 16.4 million paid subscribers, of 
which 10.7 million were external and 5.7 million internal, conducting thus 
to a record USD 6.8b in revenues (+23.2%). The international acceptance 
in the streaming services continued high during the first half of 2016 and 
the financials show us that the large investments done in acquisitions of 
contents, licensing and rights are starting to pay off.  
► Satisfying long term perspectives 
Our analysis on the industry demonstrate that the market is shifting to 
online sources over cable and satellite. Online TVs are conducting people 
to new viewing habits preferring to watch video on demand programming 
rather than scheduled and live TV. In addition, the number of connected 
video devices such as tablets, mobile devices and smart TVs will be higher 
than today and will make streaming services the primary source of TV.  
► Highly accepted and awarded titles give confidence to subscribers 
Having subscribers happy and excited is the key for the success of the 
company because they feel engaged with the service. This is the case 
when companies like Netflix have awarded and exciting titles, such as, 
“House of Cards” and “The Orange is the New Black”. Besides that, Netflix 
has a huge number of contents on its library and it is an ad-free service. 
RISK TO PRICE TARGET 
 















$ 125.57 6.00% 6.50% 7.00% 7.30% 7.50% 8.00% 8.50% 
1.50% $ 127.80 $ 115.17 $ 104.81 $ 99.39 $ 96.14 $ 88.78 $ 82.45 
2.00% $ 143.30 $ 127.58 $ 114.96 $ 108.46 $ 104.60 $ 95.94 $ 88.58 
2.50% $ 163.23 $ 143.08 $ 127.36 $ 119.42 $ 114.75 $ 104.40 $ 95.74 
2.74% $ 175.04 $ 152.04 $ 134.39 $ 125.57 $ 120.41 $ 109.05 $ 99.64 
3.00% $ 189.81 $ 163.01 $ 142.86 $ 132.93 $ 127.15 $ 114.54 $ 104.20 
3.50% $ 227.02 $ 189.59 $ 162.80 $ 149.98 $ 142.65 $ 126.95 $ 114.34 




Risk Assessment HIGH 
Time Horizon 3 MONTHS 
Industry View FAVORABLE 
Price Target USD 125.57 
STATISTICS 
 
Market Cap   USD 43.55b 
Adjusted Beta 1.37 
Float  > 95% 
52 Wk High USD 130.93 
52 Wk Low USD 82.79 
Dividend Yield         NA 
FINANCIAL METRICS YE2016 
   
Revenues USD 8.6b 
Net Profit Margin  2.7% 
Equity Ratio 18.9% 
Debt-to-Equity Ratio 137.4% 





Global Terminal Growth 2.74% 
Enterprise Value 56,992 
Debt 2016 3,371 
Cash 2016 1,461 
Equity Value 55,082 
Shares Outstanding 2016 438.65 
Target Share Price $ 125.57 
Share Price at 14/10/2016 $ 101.47 
Upside Potential +23.75% 
Source: yahoofinance.com on 14th October 2016 | 
Right axis refers to volume in millions 
Figure 1 | Simulations on WACC and Terminal Growth Rate & Monte Carlo Price Distribution 
| Red – Sell, Orange – Reduce, Yellow – Hold, Blue – Buy and Dark Blue – Strong Buy | 
Source: H. Deepak analysis 
Figure 2 | US Device Penetration in TV households 



























































Founded in 1997, Netflix is an American global provider of streaming 
movies and TV series with over 93 million subscribers around the world. 
Known as a streaming video-on-demand provider (SVoD), the members 
of this service can watch the contents they want, anytime and anywhere 
as long as they have an internet-connected device. 
 
It all started as a DVD-by-mail delivery service. In 2007, the company 
reported its billionth DVD sold and began to move from its original core 
business to streaming. In fact, back at the beginning of the decade, the 
market trends and technologies were changing and the management 
promptly decided to turn into a completely different new business line. 
Since then, the company managed to add a huge number of subscribers 
and steadily increase their revenues, offering an appealing programming 
mix of content. Not just as a provider of streaming service, Netflix also acts 
as a producer, having already won awards and gain members’ confidence.  
 
Headquartered in Los Gatos, California, the company has three segments: 
Domestic Streaming, International Streaming and Domestic DVD. For 
every business line, the revenues are derived from monthly subscription 
fees. The majority of them are generated in the United States.  
 
The Netflix service is considered the biggest source of Internet traffic in 
North America, according to Sandvine’s Global Internet Phenomena 
report. With 3,700 employees, serve over 190 countries and produce 




According to the company’s notice of Annual Meeting of stockholders held 
on June 2016, 80.7% of the company ownership were held by institutional 
and mutual funds, 4.9% held by directors and executive officers and the 
remaining 14.4% to non-institutional organizations as public and others 
(Figure 6). The highest share position among the institutional shareholders 
belongs to Capital Research Global Investors with 8.0% of shares and 
recognized as the world’s oldest and largest investment management 
organization.  
 
Each holder of a share of common stock will be entitled to one vote for 
each share held on all matters voted upon at the Annual Meeting. These 
ordinary shares grant also the right to receive information, profit sharing 
and pre-emptive rights in capital increases, as well as the generally 
applicable obligations of capital contributions and loyalty. 
Corporate Governance 
Netflix’s is organized through an Anglo-Saxon model, which includes a 
board of directors, an audit committee, a compensation committee, a 
nominating & governance committee and a statutory auditor (EY). The 
company has a flat structure. Has 5 independent directors from a total of 
17 members of the board of directors. According to the annual reports, 
Netflix continuously assesses good practices within the governance 












Figure 5 | Total paid subscribers per year |  













                 
 
Figure 6 | Ownership structure |  
Source: NASDAQ.com 
 
Note: Netflix does not have offices in China, 
Crimea, North Korea and Syria. 






Directors and Executive officers
Institutional & Mutual Funds
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Figure 3 | Official logo |  
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Company’s Key Members 
 
Reed Hastings serves Netflix Inc. as the Chairman, President and Chief 
Executive Officer. He is one of the co-founders and is graduated in 
Artificial Intelligence from Stanford University. Reed is also a board 
member of Facebook and was on the board of Microsoft from 2007 to 
2012. David Wells is the company’s Chief Financial Officer since 2010, 
holds an MBA and M.P.P. from The University of Chicago. Ted Sarandos 
has led content acquisition for Netflix since 2000 as a Chief Content 
Officer. He was considered one of the most influential people in 2013. Ted 
has also been a producer of several awarded winning documentaries and 
movies. Neil Hunt serves Netflix as the Chief Product Officer, leading the 
optimization of the Netflix experience. He holds a Doctorate in Computer 
Science from the University of Aberdeen. Kelly Bennett became Netflix 
Chief Marketing Officer in 2012 after nearly a decade at Warner Bros. 
Bennett is a graduate of Simon Fraser University. Tawni Cranz became 
Chief Talent Officer in October 2012 and manages the human resources. 
Tawni holds an EMBA from Claremont University's Peter F. Drucker and 
Masatoshi Ito Graduate School of Management. Jonathan Friedland leads 
the global team responsible for corporate communications, content 
publicity, social media and brand public relations as the Chief 
Communications Officer. He has a MSc in Economics from the London 
School of Economics. David Hyman is General Counsel for Netflix, 
responsible for all legal and public policy matters for the company. David 
earned his JD and bachelor’s degrees from the University of Virginia. Greg 
Peters is International Development Officer for Netflix, responsible for the 
global partnerships with provider and distributors. Greg holds a degree in 
physics and astronomy from Yale University (Table 2). 
Netflix, Inc. Competitive Position 
Table 1 | SWOT analysis |  
Source: H. Deepak Analysis 
Table 2 | Certain shareholders | Source: Netflix's 






































Neil Hunt CPO < 1% 
Ted 
Sarandos 
























David Wells CFO < 1% 













Company as a 
director 
< 1% 
All directors and 
executive officers as 
a group 
               4.90% 
 
Table 3 | Key management compensations | 
Numbers in 000’ of dollars | Source: Netflix's notice 
of annual meeting of stockholders - June 2016  
 
 
Strengths  Weaknesses 
 
► Leader in the industry; 
► Internationally recognized 
and strong brand 
management; 
► High quality and diverse 
contents; 




► Driven by seasonality in some 
situations; 
► Does not hedge against 
fluctuations in currency rates; 
► Strong dependence in 
suppliers; 
► Switching costs are low. 
Opportunities  Threats 
 
► Improve securitization in the 
system and streaming 
service; 
► Provide more compelling mix 
of contents in markets where 
the company just entered; 
► Expand to China; 





► Subject to rapid technology 
change; 
► Cyber-attacks, viruses and 
hackers; 
► Fraudulent usage of the 
payment methods; 
► Refusal of licenses by studio 




Annual Salary Stock Options 
2015 2016 2015 2016 
Reed 
Hastings 
1,000 900 13,700 19,050 
Neil Hunt 1,000 1,000 1,875 2,150 
Greg 
Peters 
1,000 1,000 2,725 3,275 
Ted 
Sarandos 
1,000 1,000 9,600 11,800 
David 
Wells 
2,000 2,400 1,675 1,800 
Total 6,000 6,300 29,575 38,075 
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NETFLIX BUSINESS SEGMENTS 
 
Domestic Streaming 
Revenues in the Domestic Streaming segment hit USD 4.2b in 2015, 
representing a growth of 21.8% year on year (Figure 7). This growth was 
due to an increase of 5.7 million (+15.1%) paid subscribers and, at the 
same time, an increase of 5.8% in the MRPU. For the first 2 quarters of 
2016, revenues continued to register an upward trend. Historically, the Q1 
is strong in terms of additions and that was the case, as it added 2.3 million 
paid subscribers against 290 thousand in Q2’16 (Table 4). 
The efforts made by Netflix in attracting the domestic market resulted in 
an increase of 12.4% in costs. Including more exclusive and original 
programming, cost of revenues increased 13.0% and marketing 8.2%. 
Despite these factors, the segment improved its contribution margin to 
32.9% (+5.6 pp). 
Table 4 | Overview on Domestic Streaming paid members and MRPU |  
Source: Netflix Form 10-K, Q2 2016 earnings and H. Deepak analysis 
 
Table 5 | Top 3 titles in US between 1st January – 30th June 2016 | Demand ExpressionsTM: 






1 Fuller House Netflix          6,545,791  7.1 / 10 
2 Orange Is The New Black Netflix          6,292,863  8.3 / 10 
3 11.22.63 Hulu          5,564,009  8.3 / 10 
 
International Streaming 
For 2015, International Streaming segment showed an impressive growth 
of 63.5% in paid subscribers, leading to a USD 2.0b (+49.3%) in revenues 
outside US (Figure 8). Netflix managed to add 10.7 million people with its 
strong market penetration around the world during 2015. Its MRPU 
decreased to USD 5.93 cents (-8.7%), due to the impact of exchange rate 
fluctuations. In Q1’16, the segment registered the highest addition in a 
quarter since 2010, the beginning of the expansion (Table 6). 
Financially speaking, the segment reported losses. The fact of having to 
adapt contents to its international market, country by country, by investing 
in contents locally accepted, makes its content costs base very high, 
which, when coupled with marketing expenses surpass the segment 
revenues. As a result, for 2015, the contribution margin deteriorated 4.9 
pp. For the first half of 2016, the situation is a bit different. The company 
managed to improve its contribution margin up to -9.1% in Q2’16 (+1.1 
pp.), giving us signs that from 2017 onwards, it starts delivering profits. 
Table 6 | Overview on International Streaming paid members and MRPU |  
Source: Netflix Form 10-K, Q4 earnings and H. Deepak analysis 
 
 Year Ended 3 Months Ended 
In millions except for MRPU  2014 2015 Q1'16 Q2'16 
Paid Memberships 16.778 27.438 31.993 33.892 
Additions +7.056 +10.660 +4.555 +1.899 
MRPU $ 6.50  $ 5.93  $ 6.79  $ 7.46  
Figure 7 | Domestic Streaming revenues and 
contribution margin | Numbers in 000’ except for 
contribution margin | Source: Netflix Form 10-K, 
Q2 2016 earnings and H. Deepak Analysis 
 
 
Figure 8 | International Streaming revenues and 
contribution margin | Numbers in 000’ except for 
contribution margin | Source: Netflix Form 10-K, 




Figure 9 | International expansion timeline from 
October 2012 onwards |  
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2014 2015 Q1'16 Q2'16
Year Ended 3 Months Ended
Revenues Contribution Margin
 Year Ended 3 Months Ended 
In millions except for MRPU 2014 2015 Q1'16 Q2'16 
Paid Memberships 37.698 43.401 45.714 46.004 
Additions +5.986 +5.703 +2.313 +0.290 
























Unlike streaming segments, Domestic DVD segment revenues present a 
downward trend, reaching to a USD 645.7m in 2015, a decrease of 16.0% 
compared with 2014 (Figure 11). The negative trend is explained by the 
decline in paid memberships to 4.8 million people, which corresponds to 
a loss of 881 thousand people. Historically, the Q1 for the DVD segment 
represents a slow in losses and that was verified with a loss of 140 
thousand compared to 212 thousand in Q2’16 (Table 7).  
The strong acceptance of the streaming services had an important impact 
for the company lower its investments in the DVD segment. Nevertheless, 
the segment continues to deliver profits and we highlight the fact that this 
is the business line with the highest contribution margin. Since 2014, the 
company benefits from the absence of marketing expenses, which boosts 
its contribution margins up to, approximately, 50.0%.   
Table 7 | Overview on Domestic DVD paid memberships and MRPU |  
Source: Netflix Q2 earnings and H. Deepak Analysis 
Netflix segments weight  
In 2015, Netflix revenues came from 61.7% of Domestic Streaming, 
28.8% of International Streaming and 9.5% of Domestic DVD (Figure 12). 
Even though Domestic DVD is an obsolete segment, we highlight the fact 
that it still delivers profits, in which, the company uses to invest in the 
streaming part of the business. Considering all the operational expenses, 
Domestic Streaming segment is the most efficient one, with 32.9% of 
contribution margin in the overall business. International Streaming 
segment, which is still giving losses, is expected to turn into a profit-
making segment after large investments done in contents and marketing 
in the last 2 years. To note that international marketing expenses 
surpassed domestic ones in 2014. In 2015, it ended USD 188.8m ahead 
of domestic (Figure 10 & 13). 
Figure 10 | Marketing expenses per segment |  




Figure 11 | Domestic DVD revenues and 
contribution margin | Numbers in 000’ except for 
contribution margin | Source: Netflix Form 10-K, 




Figure 12 | Segment weights |  
Source: Netflix Form 10-K and H. Deepak Analysis 
 
 
Figure 13 | Contribution margin per segment | 


























































2014 2015 Q1'16 Q2'16
Year Ended 3 Months Ended
Revenues Contribution Margin
 Year Ended 3 Months Ended 
In millions except for MRPU 2014 2015 Q1'16 Q2'16 
Paid Memberships 5.668 4.787 4.647 4.435 
Additions -1.097 -0.881 -0.140 -0.212 
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Boston Consulting Group Matrix 
From a BCG perspective, the displayed figure (Figure 14) shows the 
position of the 3 segments Netflix operates relative to market growth and 
market share. Given the Form 10-K, the firm has its segments on Cash 
Cow, Star and Dog. 
The ‘Cash Cow’ at Netflix is the Domestic Streaming segment. The growth 
perspectives of this segment for the medium / long term are moderate to 
low. The company will need to continuously attract people with new and 
interesting content. Currently, Netflix is the leader in US, having a market 
share of around 80%, according to Parrot Analytics. Its 47.9 million paid 
subscribers help the company generate high amounts of cash, allowing 
the company to reinvest the money in their International segment. It is the 
flagship of the company. 
We classified the International Streaming segment as ‘Star’, as this 
segment presents a high growth rate. However, there is some uncertainty 
relatively of how much market share the segment earned around the world 
during 2015 and 2016. Its heavy investments need to be justified with high 
revenues. Its content offerings need to be in line with the peoples’ 
preferences. It is important to note that the company is in a learning 
process when offers its packages, as it needs to adapt them country by 
country. We could classify the segment as a ‘Question Mark’, but we 
believe Netflix will manage to attract many people by extending and 
improving its library of contents. We believe Netflix will be the world leader 
in SVoD services.  
Domestic DVD segment is evaluated as ‘Dog’. This segment is the 
foundation of the firm and it is still generating revenues even if it has been 
broken down some years ago due to the technology changes in the 
industry. There are no growth perspectives and the market share for 
DVDs is completely consumed by streaming services and piracy. Cleary 
the segment has achieved its break even in the past, as it is experiencing 




Figure 14 | BCG Matrix |  













In 2015, Netflix managed to increase its revenues to USD 6.8b (+23.2%). 
The improvements were essentially driven by the growth in international 
activities, in which the company added more than 10 million paid 
subscribers in the overall base. Revenues could have been higher if the 
MRPU was not affected by exchange rate fluctuations. Despite that, their 
Domestic Streaming segment also performed well, reporting a growth of 
21.8% in revenues and adding 5.7 million paid subscribers (Figure 16). To 
note that this number represents a slowdown in additions (2014: 6.0 
million), however, this was partially offset by an increase in MRPU of 5.8%. 
 
Cost of revenues rose 22.3% to USD 4.6b. The costs were mainly driven 
by the licensing and acquisition of new streaming contents as a result of 
the company's expansion to Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Spain, 
Portugal and Italy. Other costs’ details, comprising cost of revenues, such 
as, streaming delivery expenses (cloud computing costs), equipment 
costs and customer service and payment processing fees also increased. 
 
Marketing expenses, seen as a key operating source to attract people, 
grew by 35.7%, mainly due to advertisements done on the territories 
launched. General & administrative costs raised 51.0% as a consequence 
of the implementation of new offices as well as the hiring of new 
employees. And technology & development, 37.8% (Figure 17). In 
general, operating costs grew by 39.5% and deteriorated EBIT to USD 
305.8m (vs USD 402.6m), a decrease of 2.8 pp. in margin. 
 
Interests expenses more than doubled deteriorating its interest cover ratio 
(Figure 18). This is explained by the fact that Netflix issued two long-term 
senior notes in February 2015 of USD 700.0m and USD 800.0m maturing 
on 2022 and 2025, respectively. The firm is now committed to pay interests 
semi-annually on April and October at fixed rates of 5.5% and 5.9%. 
 
In the overall, the investments done throughout the year affected the 
profitability of the company. Due to the expansion, Netflix increased its 
operating costs and acquired new contents, which triggered to a lower, but 














Figure 16 | Additions per segment in 2014 and 




Figure 17 | Operating costs evolution |  


















Figure 15 | Income Statement bridge in 2015 |  































Figure 18 | Interest cover ratio in 2014 and 2015 | 
Numbers in millions except for interest cover ratio | 

























For what the first half of 2016 accounts look like, the company is showing 
signs of a good performance. Additions during Q1’16 and Q2’16 amounted 
to 6.7 and 2.0 million people, respectively. A large part of additions was 
made by its International Streaming segment with 6.5 million new paid 
subscribers (74.1% of total additions in the first half of 2016) (Figure 20). 
To note that, the company is reporting higher levels of revenues every 
quarter. In Q2’16, revenues amounted to USD 2.1b (Figure 22). For this 
to occur, not only helped additions, but also the positive performance seen 
in MRPU. Comparing with YE2015, MRPU raised by 11.4% (USD +0.85 
cents) at the end of the first half 2016 (Figure 19). 
 
Given the Q2’16 financials, Netflix is showing us signs that its international 
expansion is starting to pay off. Even with higher amounts expensed in 
operations (Figure 21), the company is recovering its margin (Figure 22). 
We highlight the fact that from Q1’16 to Q2’16, the operating margin 
increased 0.8 pp to 3.3%.  
 
There is still a lot of work to do. The high investments in contents and in 
licensing must be justified by higher revenues and that will be the key for 




Figure 20 | Additions per segment in Q1 and Q2 





Figure 21 | Operating costs in Q1 and Q2 2016 | 




Figure 22 | Revenues and contribution margin in 
Q1 and Q2 2016 | Numbers in millions | Source: 
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Figure 19 | MRPU evolution | 




























On the Assets side, the main components are contents and cash & cash 
equivalents, representing 70.8% and 17.7% of total B/S, respectively. To 
note that of 70.8%, 42.3% corresponds to non-current contents and 28.5% 
to current contents. As reported in the statuary accounts, they grew 46.1% 
from USD 4.9b in 2014 to USD 7.2b in 2015, leading to a B/S size increase 
of 44.9% from USD 7.0b to USD 10.2b in 2015. As aforementioned, this 
increase is associated with the investments in acquisitions and licensing 
of streaming content for the countries Netflix expanded during the year. 
 
On the Equity & Liabilities side, the main components are the obligations 
of contents and its long-term debt, representing 47.2% and 23.2% of total 
B/S, respectively. Every time a title becomes available for streaming, a 
content liability is recorded on the B/S. Under these circumstances, the 
recent purchases of contents triggered to an increase of obligations to 
content and right holders. In 2015, these content liabilities increased by 
30.4% from USD 3.7b to USD 4.8b (Figure 24). Equity ratio stood at 
21.8%, a decrease of 4.6 pp. due to the lower results for the year. To note 
that, in the last 5 years, the company managed to keep its Equity weigh 
nearly 1/5 of the total B/S. 
Net Debt 
Historically, Netflix has either held more cash & cash equivalents than debt 
or the reverse situation. In 2014, had a net cash position of USD 227.8m 
while in 2015 it had a net debt position of USD 562.0m (Figure 24).  
► Over the last 4 years, cash & cash equivalents registered an increase 
of 6.2x from USD 290.3m in 2012 to USD 1.8b in 2015. This 
substantial increase is a proof of how much cash Netflix can generate. 
As its International Streaming segment is still giving losses, money 
came directly from its domestic segments, in which, Domestic 
Streaming segment contributes the most. 
 
► Netflix’s debt more than doubled in 2015, surpassing the level of 
Equity. Its debt-to-equity ratio raised to 106.7% from 47.7% (Figure 
28). Following the policy of using debt instead of equity to finance its 
growth, the company issued two long-term senior notes amounting to 
USD 700.0m and USD 800.0m. The issuance of these debts led the 





Figure 27 | Debt-to-Equity ratio evolution | Left axis 
in millions | Source: Netflix Form 10-K and H. 
Deepak analysis 
 
Figure 23 | Balance sheet composition in 2015 | 
Source: Netflix Form 10-K and H. Deepak analysis 
 
 
Figure 25 | Total Content Assets vs Streaming 
Liabilities | Numbers in millions | Source: Netflix 




















Cash & Cash Equivalents Long-term Debt Net Debt vs Net Cash
Figure 24 | Net debt vs net cash from 2013 to 2015 |  
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Figure 26 | Streaming content liabilities maturities | 
Numbers in millions | Source: Netflix Form 10-K 
and H. Deepak analysis  
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Cash Flow Statement 
The lower Net Income in 2015 coupled with a higher amount of cash spent 
in contents led to a negative Cash Flow from Operations. The substantial 
increase in cash spent in contents from USD 3.2b in 2014 to USD 4.6b in 
2015 (+44.9%) was a direct consequence of the company’s expansion. 
Focused in offering the best packages for each country the company 
entered during the year, Netflix had to acquire contents and licensing’s 
locally accepted even though it had the possibility to operate with its 
awarded original contents.  
 
Despite the higher level of cash spent on contents, the company improved 
its working capital in 2015. To note that, the company does not have 
receivables neither inventories due to its business model. As they are an 
all cash company, Netflix collects its monthly subscription fees by charging 
the subscribers every month on the sign-up date. As per the inventory, 
Netflix has a “library of contents”, in which contains DVD and streaming 
contents. The company classifies DVD contents as non-current content 
assets. The reason DVD is labeled as non-current is based on the 
estimated time the asset will be used. For streaming contents, the portion 
available for streaming within one year is recognized as current content 
assets and the remaining portion as non-current content assets.  
Working capital has been steadily improving since 2012 (Figure 29). 
However, its Cash Flow from Operations was negative reflecting the 
heavy acquisitions made in streaming contents, which amounted to USD 
4.6b and corresponds to nearly 70% of revenues. International expansion 
is bringing risks to the company as it is consuming a big part of its cash 
(Figure 30).    
To worsen the situation, the company’s Cash Flow from Investments 
suffered a decrease of USD 136.3m due to lower sales of short-term 
investments. These factors together lead the company to issue more 
debt. Cash Flow from Financing tripled due to the issuance of USD 1.5b 
in senior notes. At the end, Net Change in Cash stood at USD 695.7m, an 
increase of USD 186.6m in comparison with 2014 (Figure 28). 
For what the first half of 2016 cash flow figures look like, the company is 
showing that the investments done in the countries expanded in 2015 are 
starting to pay off and generate cash. Cash spent in contents continued 
to increase quarter by quarter as the company adapts its packages country 
by country. Despite the higher content expenses, the company ended 



































Figure 30 | Cash flow bridge in 2015 |  
Numbers in millions | Source: Netflix Form 10-K and H. Deepak analysis 
Figure 29 | Working capital development |  
Numbers in millions | Source: H. Deepak analysis 
Figure 31 | Cash flows in Q1’16 and Q2’16 | 
Numbers in millions | Source: Netflix Form 10-K, 
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Net Change in Cash & Cash Equivalents
Figure 28 | Summary of the cash flows in the last 3 
years | Numbers in millions | Source: Netflix Form 
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Not long ago, “watching TV” meant sitting in front of the screen in our living 
room, waiting for the favorite program to come up at a scheduled time. 
Today, traditional TV providers such as, cable, satellite and 
telecommunications are threatened by the rise of online TV, creating 
extensive options for consumers and changing our viewing habits. 
The appearance of online TVs is conducting people to watch video-on-
demand - VoD - programming rather than scheduled and live TV. This type 
of programming is mostly offered through the internet instead of through 
traditional set-top boxes. Often referred as Over-the-Top Television – 
OTT TV, people get access to these types of programming via subscription 
with online VoD providers. Once the subscription is done, we download 
the content we want and start watching it. 
Many industries have gone through a digital transformation process. 
Music, travel and retail are some of the industries that were reshaped by 
the internet. Some other industries are preparing for what is coming, just 
like the TV industry. OTT TV is the digital turning point for the TV industry. 
TRADITIONAL TV VS OTT TV – PEOPLE’S BEHAV IOR  
 
The impact of OTT TVs is not limited to the way we watch TV, but yet 
related to whether or not it changes our viewing habits. 2015 was the first 
year many traditional TV providers faced a decline in its subscriber’s base. 
OTT TV is making people to cut the cord and realize the advantages it 
delivers. It is a sign that VoD is transforming the way we watch TV. So, 
what truly make people prefer OTT TV over traditional TV? The Nielsen’s 
Global Video-on-Demand Survey pooled over 30,000 online respondents 
across 61 countries answers this question (Figure 34 & 35):  
1. As expected, convenience is appointed by the respondents to be the 
most important factor to watch VoD. Among those who watch VoD, 
77% say that they do because they can watch the content at a time 
that is convenient for them. 
2. The connectivity and mobility that allows multiple people watch 
different programs on different devices at the same time is another 
reason pointed out by 66% of the respondents. 
3. The possibility of watching several episodes in a row, known as binge-
watching, is considered by 66% of the respondents a fundamental 
feature and a tremendous motivator to have VoD. People recognize 
this added value in comparison with traditional TV and some of them 
even use this way as a primary method to watch TV. 
4. Finally, when it comes to pricing, people are sensitive and so they are 
when they compare the reduced price VoD offers over traditional TV 
providers. 60% say that watching programs through OTT TV services 
is less expensive than watching through cable or satellite. 
 
Not just talking about the benefits of VoD, 72% say that they would like to 
have more program choices available and 67% indicated that watching 
VoD programs on an online or mobile device is not as good as watching it 
on a bigger screen. We believe, as well, that the internet coverage is 
somewhat affecting people to access VoD. In rural areas, the internet 
speed is not as fast as urban areas and given the high internet speed 
requirement by VoD services to download contents, we consider the low 
internet coverage in rural areas an issue to consumers watch VoD. 
Figure 32 | TV connections | 







Figure 33 | OTT options | 






Figure 34 | OTT TV drivers | 




“OTT TV also provides contents passed on the 
traditional TV. To battle against the rise of 
such online providers, traditional TV operators 
created the TVE service – TV Everywhere – 
accessible online.” 
 























Figure 35 | OTT TV inconvenient |  













REPLACE OR SUPPLEMENT? 
 
It is important to note that many traditional TV companies include these 
VoD programming in its packages through partnerships. VoD could also 
be downloaded or streamed over traditional TV. Given this, the question 
that arises is to understand whether people replace or supplement VoD 
services to its cable/satellite TV packages. Let’s see. 
Following Nielsen’s Global Video-on-Demand Survey, while 26% of 
viewers say they pay to watch VoD programs via subscription to an online 
service provider, 72% say they pay to watch it via a traditional TV 
connection (Figure 36). At a first glance, we note that it is acting more as 
a supplement than a replacer. 
However, in US, traditional TV watching time per day has been decreasing 
since 2013 (Figure 37). At the same time, we saw an extraordinary 
increase in some OTT TVs subscribers’ base, in particular, Netflix. Does 
this mean OTT TV is moving to the center stage and winning audiences 
against traditional TVs? A realistic way to assess this issue is to analyze 
the time spent per day watching TV across the population by group ages. 
Let’s call: Generation Z to people from 15 to 20 years old, Millennials from 
21 to 34, Generation X between 35 and 49, Baby Boomers in a range of 
50-64 and Silent Generation from 65 onwards. 
Nielsen’s Global Video-on-Demand report revealed that older viewers 
watch more traditional TV. Generation Z and Millennials watch less linear 
TV (Figure 38). This means that long-term prospects for VoD players are 
in a good way. Roughly 40% of Generation Z and 38% of Millennials who 
are consumers of cable or satellite services say they plan to cut the cord 
in favor of an online service provider – a rate that is approximately 3 times 
higher than Baby Boomers and 4 times higher than Silent Generation 
(Figure 39). If at the beginning, we said that VoD services were 
supplementing traditional TV, here, we consider it will be a replacer 
considering the long-term prospects it will have. Backed by its young 
generation, these people will become fathers and mothers one day, and 
as it is usually said “children learn from family”, certainly their kids will learn 
watching TV through OTT TVs and will never know what really “watching 
TV” through traditional TV connection was. In fact, in 2015, Millennials 
became the largest group age in US, surpassing Baby Boomers. This is a 
clear signal that younger viewers are changing the rules. Could we 
assume that the end of the traditional TV might be nigh? 
 
Figure 39 | Percentage of cable / satellite 
subscribers who plan to cancel its service in favor 
of an online service | Source: Nielsen Global Video 




Figure 36 | How do people watch VoD? | 
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Figure 38 | Percentage of respondents who currently pay providers for programming | 
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Figure 37 | Average live TV watching per year vs 
Netflix’s streaming subscribers per year | Left axis 
in time & right axis in millions | Source: Nielsen 
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WHAT IS TRADITIONAL TV DOING TO FIGHT FOR ITS 
FUTURE? 
 
 TV Everywhere 
 
To fight against the rising of OTT TVs, traditional TV companies started to 
play on the same ground as them. Many linear TV companies created an 
online platform, known as TV Everywhere - TVE. This service is 
complementary to the regular TV and allows viewers to stream TV content 
(generally live TV, catch up TV and some VoD) over the internet (same 
process as OTT TVs). The expectations generated around TVE were very 
high, but the truth is TVE has not reached yet enough potential to battle 
face-to-face against OTT TVs. Therefore, traditional TV providers are 
working in the improvement and personalization of TVE platforms, at the 
same time, willing to raise further awareness and usage. 
 Partnerships, Merges & Acquisitions 
 
We aforementioned that many regular TV providers include VoD services 
in their package options through partnerships. In fact, even if traditional 
providers control two important utilities for most of the households, 
television and internet, they assume that is almost impossible to fight and 
win against them. TVE is the perfect example of it. It was not sufficient to 
captive people.  
To bypass and gain some leverage, traditional TV providers started to 
make deals with OTT competitors. “If you can’t beat them, join them”. 
Partnerships, merges and acquisitions are expected in the next few years 
leading to a massive consolidation in the TV industry (Figure 41). Not 
standing aside, some traditional TV operators are starting to reevaluate its 
business models, setting-up teams to create VoD platforms. Over the next 
years, we can expect, as well, a huge number of entrants on the TV 
industry, offering an incredible number of VoD options and increasing 
competition. 
Table 8 | OTT TV offerings: Previous and releases | 
Source: Google.com 
2014 2015 2016 
 
 Live Content  
One clear advantage for traditional TV providers is that there are no 
substitutes for live content, such as, news and sports. The only reason 
people stick with traditional TV it’s because it airs live. In our view, we think 
that this important feature will be the key to boost partnerships and merges 
with the exchange of live content with VoD options. 
Can we expect OTT players to air live? We don’t know yet, but some of 






Figure 42 | Live airing | 
Source: Netflix Media Center 
 
 
Figure 40 | TVEverywhere players |  
Source: Google.com 




 Advertisement  
 
Putting traditional TV operators and OTT TVs together will appeal not only 
audiences worldwide, but also advertisers. Advertisement companies 
follow audiences. So, what will happen to ads with the appearance of OTT 
TVs? 2016 could be the first-year US digital ad spend surpasses TV ad 
spend, according to eMarketer.com estimates, indicating what was 
previously said - advertisers are moving together with viewers to VoD 
platforms.   
It is a fact that many viewers do not like to waste their time watching ads, 
giving reasons to ad companies to be afraid. Nielsen’s Video-on-Demand 
report shows that 62% of the respondents who watch VoD say that online 
ads are distracting and 65% say they wish they could block or avoid all the 
ads. The numbers disclose that ad companies must do something to 
survive in its future, but what? Are they stuck? Will we see the end of ad 
in line with the possible end of traditional TVs? 
The good news for advertisers is that many consumers value ads, but 
most of them consider it irrelevant. While 51% strongly agree that ads in 
VoD content give them good ideas for new products, 59% say they do not 
mind watch ads if they can view VoD for free. Given the numbers, there 
are two facts ad companies should focus around: 
1. First, create more relevant ads that speak directly to consumers 
because 66% say that most ads in VoD content are for products they 
do not want. 
2. And second, discover new ways to advertise, because what is 



































































Figure 43 | US TV vs Digital Ad Spending | 





Block or avoid ads
Figure 45 | Unfavorable reasons related with ads | 




Ads give them good ideas
for new products
I don't mind watch ads if I
can view it for free
Figure 44 | Favorable reasons related with ads |  
Source: Nielsen Global Video on Demand Report, March 2016 
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WHY DO PEOPLE LIKE NETFLIX? 
 
Netflix is an example of an OTT TV. The company launched its VoD service in 2007 in US and since then has been 
broken all the limits. What do they do to be so successful?  
The key to its success is the service offered to subscribers: 
1. First of all, and for us the most important factor, is related with the content it offers. Quantity and quality of contents 
are two features Netflix does not give away to captive people. It makes difference when viewers decide in which 
VoD platform to subscribe. In US, Netflix has around 9,000 titles and in countries within their operations, they exceed 
2,000 titles for each country. Moreover, some of the TV series Netflix offers are exclusively available on its 
platform, making it more appealing for consumers. Despite having exclusive contents, Netflix is also known as a 
content producer. With originals like “The House of Cards” and “Orange is The New Black” produced, the company 
has already won Emmy Awards and a good reputation among the consumers. In addition, having the library of 
contents always up-to-date makes the service more attractive. 
2. Secondly, Netflix’s platform is dynamic, easy and well designed, allowing viewers to ease its navigation. The 
platform also guides viewers to certain contents with its recommendation tool, refreshing them with new entries 
and signaling trending contents. 
3. Thirdly, the internet neutrality rules in US and in Europe prohibit Internet Service Providers – ISP, to demand for 
compensations regarding the amount of traffic web publishers generate through its ISP’s network, allowing Netflix 
and other internet TV companies to offer a competitive price to its subscribers compared, per example, with a 
traditional TV provider offering a similar VoD service. This free ride on the internet makes Netflix’s service one of 
the cheapest in the market of OTT TVs. 
4. OTT TV enables the collection of detailed viewer data, given the possibility of precisely track what has been viewed 
by consumers. These detailed information Netflix and other companies collect, allows them to better estimate the 
audience size when, per example, a new content is to be produced. On the other side, showing this data to content 
holders gives them a competitive advantage in relation to traditional TV operators, since they are not able to collect 
such detailed data themselves. In this regard, OTT TVs have got the gold in his hands to convince content owners 
to license. 
5. And finally, Netflix is ad-free. We aforementioned that 65% of the people who watch VoD wish they could block or 
avoid ads. That’s right, being an ad-free service, makes these people feel in heaven. 
 
Of course, at the end, all these features together enhance fidelity and confidence among the subscribers. The 
achievements Netflix has been reaching along the way are not just linked to the features pointed out above. Like all the 
other successful companies, Netflix had its luck. Initially, several content owners underestimated the potential of VoD 
services, licensing contents at a “low-cost” price. As a consequence, the company could provide appealing contents 
with a modest monthly subscription price and quickly captive an extraordinary number of subscribers. 
Figure 46 | Netflix success factors | 
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With the rise of VoD platforms, players in the market struggle with each other to offer the best package at the best price 
possible. The competition in the TV industry is high and is expected to increase sharply in the coming years with the 
appearance of new players. VoD offerings will be the key to catch peoples’ viewing. It will be necessary to look for what 
competitors will do and follow or differentiate them. 
Netflix’s main competitors are Amazon Prime Video and Hulu Plus, putting aside the illegal VoD players. For that 
ones, Netflix could not compete as they offer content for free with the inconvenience of having lots of ads incorporated. 
Therefore, we will not consider them here. According to a study released by Digitalsmiths, in US, Netflix is the leader 
with 51.8% market share, following Amazon Prime Video with 24.8% and Hulu Plus with 9.9%. Please note that we 
have not performed a financial peer analysis because Amazon and Hulu (Owned by Hulu LLC, a joint venture with The 
Walt Disney Company (30%), 21st Century Fox (30%), Comcast (30%), and Time Warner (10%, minority stake)) report 
consolidated accounts. As such, we have focused on the strategy/service each one has. 
Being the leader does not mean being the best in all features. They all differ in processes to reach viewers. While 
Amazon Prime Video is not capable to obtain precise viewer data as Netflix and Hulu Plus do, due to its business model 
that only allows to access user’s shopping data, Amazon can obtain data of what people is looking for watch by analyzing 
which books and TV/shows sell the most. After collecting the top sellers’ data, Amazon provides the opportunity to 
people decide which content the company is going to produce. At the end, giving people the power of such decisions, 
make them feel more engaged and gain fidelity with the service they pay. Notwithstanding, Netflix doesn’t give the 
possibility of people to decide, however, they don’t need to do it due to the very detailed data they collect, which indirectly 
gives the company an idea of what people want. Moving forward, one clear competitive advantage Amazon had was 
the allowance of watching contents offline. However, to watch the content, we need first to download it, and that is not 
possible without an internet connection. Netflix was one step back on this but recently, they updated its platform with 
the offline viewing feature. With this, the company expects users to somewhat reduce their problems in viewing content, 
especially in rural areas where internet coverage is not the best. If the offline feature was the competitive advantage 
until soon, now Streaming Partners Program – SPP – is the one who gets the position. Amazon’s SPP supports small 
and medium players to scale their business and reach a higher number of customers by merchandising its videos on 
Amazon’s platform. For that reason, we consider Amazon Prime Video not just a consumer-focus but also a company-
focus player in the market, driven by its creative business model. We can say that Netflix is the leader of the market, 
but the innovation award goes to Amazon Prime Video. 
Hulu Plus is playing in a different proportion as it doesn’t have the size of Netflix and Amazon (yet). In 2013, the CEO 
and its content team were replaced by Hollywood executives. Since then, they managed to raise by 50% its subscribers’ 
base as a result of a massive marketing initiatives and partnerships with traditional TV operators. To be able to reach 
the level of the competitors, Hulu Plus needs to follow what has been made by Netflix and Amazon. One is concerning 
the release time as they still release episodes once a week and, two is related with the content offered as their main 
focuses are comedies and reality, due to its low budget requirements. With that in mind, we could imagine they will 
begin to release outside the traditional seasonality as there is more opportunity to engage viewers and improve its 
offerings and originals to help attract more subscribers.  
Figure 48 | Amazon Prime logo |  
Source: Amazon Press room 
 
 




Michael E. Porter’s five forces model 
Porter’s model is based on the insight that a corporate strategy should meet the opportunities and threats in the 
organizations external environment. Companies should focus on competitive strategy and understand the industry 
changes. Porter has identified five competitive forces that shape every industry. These forces determine the intensity 
of competition and hence the profitability and attractiveness of an industry. The objective of corporate strategy should 









Industry rivalry: High 
The market for VoD is highly competitive. The product differentiation is low, enhancing competition among providers. 
Companies compete on content selection and the best they can do is to attract people with the features they have. One 
common feature among competitors is the “next-day viewing” of current hits. Netflix does not have the same ability to 
stream soon after airing as Amazon does. In other words, some people would think “watching a TV show three months 
after it airs is not as exciting as to see it before catching up”. In terms of pricing, the difference is minimal, but, Netflix 
has the highest price and that pressure them to make sure its selection of titles justifies the price.  
Threat of Substitutes Services: Moderate  
Traditional cable services, such as HBO and Fox, continue to be popular and will be a threat once they provide their 
own streaming service for free to their subscribers. There is also a high degree of seasonality on Netflix services. In 
general, when the weather is colder, the company has more subscribers. As spring hits, many people watch less Netflix 
and do other things. Piracy is another concern for the company. It is hard to compete against free and it is considered 
a highly replaceable “service” of Netflix. 
Threat of New Entrants: Very High  
Since VoD become popular, the number of new entrants have been rising and it is expected to further welcome more 
players in the next 3 years. Some companies are trying to appeal people with contents of his interests. This strategy 
can make subscribers switch services. An example of this situation is linked with Fandor, which offers foreign films, 
independent movies and documentaries different from Netflix. On the other side, to compete the size of Netflix, new 
entrants would need to partner with an established brand, network or studio. YouTube Red is an example of it. It is 
backed by Google and a possible competitor of Netflix in the near future. 
Bargaining Power of Suppliers: Moderate  
Netflix needs to make sure it secures contracts with the most popular networks and studios in order to keep its 
customers happy. Some of the contracts are related towards the number of subscribers and if, for any reason, Netflix’s 
subscriber base shrinks, the company still has to pay the rights for the length of the contract. Suppliers could stop 
providing their own productions to Netflix if something goes wrong. It is possible for these suppliers to keep content 
exclusive to their platforms or even charge Netflix a huge premium to stream it. For this reason, Netflix has a diversified 
number of suppliers in which they developed a strategic alliance. Additionally, the company also produces content and 
for the long-term, the goal is to achieve 50% of self-produced contents on its entire portfolio. 
Bargaining Power of Consumers: High  
One of the biggest issues Netflix faces is related with low costs of switching services. There is no contract and the cost 
of signing up for a service is minimal or sometimes even free. It is easy to a customer subscribe one month with one 
service and then switch to another one. In fact, most VoD providers offer a free trial to attract people subscribe into the 
service. Pricing and content selections are issues for consumers. People will always choose the best combined options 


























Figure 49 | Michael E. Porter’s five forces |  





The future might be bright for these players, but that does not mean they stop innovating its services. Netflix’s plans for 
the near future are live content, starting with news and sports, Bollywood contents, the largest movie industry in the 
world, anime content to attract kids and expand to China (long-term goal). We do not know what are the plans of the 
competitors spoken above, but what we know is if one starts with something new, the others will follow. There might be 
innumerous possibilities to differentiate but as we reach the saturation in the market, differentiation will be harder. 
What could we expect in the following years? 
Over the next years, the number of connected video devices such as tablets, mobile devices and smart TVs will be 
higher than today and will conduct to open the doors for a huge proliferation of OTT TV offerings. As a consequence, 
we expect traditional TV companies to have an OTT strategy to secure their position in the market or even continue 
forming alliances as some are doing today. In addition, we will see the competition to steadily increase with the 
appearance of new players. They could be legal companies or even illegal ones. We will see legal companies fight 
against piracy as this is the main concern for them to lose subscribers. We will see consumers move to OTT TVs over 
cable or satellite TV. OTT will become the primary provider of TV for younger audiences as Baby Boomers exit the 
market. We will see a complete transformation in our TV packages. We will control every content we wish to see. The 
demand will be high but the supply even higher. The subscription prices could increase but people will expect to pay 
less for greater content. And we are going to stop guessing what might happen because the truth is, there is a world of 
possibilities that could happen. We do not know the future. We will never know. But the signs of today are indicating us 
that the world is changing and the TV industry as well. 
Traditional scheduled TV watching is no longer the norm. OTT TV is now the mainstream and has arrived as the 
superstar to the industry. Television used to control people viewing habits, but now, people get control of WHAT they 























KEY VALUATION DRIVERS 
 
Revenues 
The starting point is related to our revenues forecast. We have forecasted 
the revenues by segment. If we had foreseen in a consolidated basis, we 
could have underestimated the total revenues. So that, in our point of view, 
it was more reliable analyzing the revenues by each business line of the 
company. 
We have forecasted our revenues by studying the historical revenues’ 
growth on each segment over the past 5 years. To have a true view on 
revenues for 2016, we also performed an analysis quarter by quarter over 
the past 2 years and the first 3 quarters of 2016. Attached to that process, 
we also considered the additions on paid subscribers year on year based 
on the business line.  
After all, to validate our forecasts, we compared our results with the 
analysts’ general estimates (Figure 51). 
Gross Profit Margin  
To the intent of reaching a value, we analyzed the company’s gross profit 
margin performance in the past 5 years and forecasted a margin up to 
40% until 2021. We believe the company will do good by then and will 
reduce its cost of revenues as they become more efficient (Figure 52). 
Cash Spent in Contents & Amortizations 
Considering that a large part of the costs contains amortizations of 
contents, we forecasted amortizations through the relationship with cash 
spent in contents, by analyzing the ratio between them (cash spent in 
contents / total amortizations), which states that, if the ratio is higher than 
1, the company is investing more than its depreciating and below 1, the 
reverse situation.  
First, we started by seeing what proportion of revenues were used to 
invest in contents in the past 5 years and more precisely in the past 2 
years’ quarter by quarter. The reason behind studying the proportion of 
revenues quarter by quarter is related with the company’s expansion 
during that time, in which, large acquisitions and licensing were done.  
By seeing the historical data and considering the dual effect of the high 
competition in the industry and the increasing programming costs, we 
forecasted an average of 64.6% of revenues used in contents for the next 
5 years, which is the same level compared with the last 2 years (Figure 
53). Reaching to the future values on cash spent, we then saw the ratios 
between cash spent in contents and amortizations in the past and 
forecasted it until 2021. We have considered a multiple above 1 due to the 
company’s content production focusses (Figure 50).  
Figure 51 | Revenues forecast by segment | 
Numbers in millions | Source: Netflix Form 10-K 
and H. Deepak analysis 
 
Figure 52 | Gross profit margin estimates |  






















Figure 53 | Cash spent in contents vs Total 
revenues | Numbers in millions | Source: Netflix 
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Figure 50 | Ratio: Cash spent on contents / Amortizations of contents |  















Historically analyzed, marketing, technology & development and general 
and administrative expenses were forecasted as a percentage of the total 
revenues. To note that we have considered increased operational 
expenses for 2016 and 2017 due to its international activities and then 
slightly declining until 2018. From 2018 onwards, we kept the levels 
constant. Here, we have also studied the movements in these 3 items 
quarter by quarter in the last 2 years to avoid discrepancies (Figure 54). 
Working Capital  
The company’s working capital is composed by other current assets, 
accounts payables, accrued expenses, deferred revenue and other non-
current assets & liabilities. Since we do not have any details regarding 
these items, except for accounts payables, we estimated values for the 
next 5 years as a percentage of total revenues. 
For the next 2 years, we estimated account payables based on 20 days of 
cost of revenues, which corresponds to the average of the last 2 years. 
Until 2021, we believe the company will be more efficient year over year 





We have followed the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method for the valuation of Netflix, Inc. A Dividend Discount Model 
is not suitable, as Netflix’s dividend distribution is rare. A Multiple valuation was not performed because the Netflix’s 
main competitors present consolidated reports, and thus we do not have sufficient financials to perform such valuation 
method. By using a DCF approach, we estimated the corresponding streams of Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF). To 
note that the valuation was performed considering constant prices. 
Methodology: WACC = We * Re + Wd * Rd (1-Tx) 
 Cost of Equity: Re = Rf + ß (Rm-Rf) 
To compute our cost of equity (Re), we have followed the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Firstly, we started by computing 
the market return (Rm) by extracting the monthly historical stock prices of Morgan Stanley Capital International - All 
Country World Index (MSCI ACWI) over the last 5 years until 15th October 2016. The reason behind choosing such 
index is by the fact that Netflix is a worldwide entity and labors everywhere, therefore, we think this index suits the most 
as it works with developed and undeveloped countries, giving a realistic vision of the global market return nowadays. 
After extracting, we computed the monthly returns, and then the geometric mean of them. We had to add 1 to calculate 
the geometric mean since this approach does not work with negative returns. We then annualized the result and reached 
to a market return of 7.95%. 
The next step was to find a risk-free rate (Rf), and as such, we decided to consider an US 30-year treasury bond yield 
as we believe that constitutes a reasonable proxy for an American company. The rate observed on 14th October 2016 
was 2.55%. Thus, we could compute the market risk premium (Rm-Rf) of 5.40%. 
Finally, we needed the beta (ß). Therefore, we proceeded in the same manner as we did with the market return, but this 
time with the extraction of weekly historical stock prices on ACWI index and Netflix Inc. over the last two years. We 
extracted weekly stock prices over the last two years to better capture the risks the company faced in the expansion to 
12 countries during that time. Once we calculated the returns of both indexes, we computed the raw beta using the 
excel function “Slope”, giving us a value of 1.55. Then, we computed the adjusted beta, i.e., the Blume adjusted beta, 
which basically corresponds to an estimation of the security’s future beta. We have assumed that the Netflix’s true beta 
will move towards the market average of 1 over time. The formula used to adjust the beta was: 2/3 x raw beta + 1/3 x 
1.0. Based on that, we have reached to an adjusted beta of 1.37. At the end, our cost of equity was equal to 9.93% as 
you can see below: 
9.93% = 2.55% + 1.37 (7.95% - 2.55%) 
Figure 54 | Operational expenses forecast as a % 















Cost of Debt 
To estimate our cost of debt (Rd), we have used the weighted average interest rate on the company’s debt of 3.96%.  
Table 9 | Netflix's debt |  
Source: Netflix Form 10-K and finra.com 
 
Issuer name Callable Coupon Yield Maturity Moody Debt Amount 
Yield x Debt 
Amount 
NETFLIX INC  Yes 5.500% 3.726% 01-03-22 B1 717,500,000 26,734,050 
NETFLIX INC  Yes 5.875% 4.382% 01-02-25 B1 820,000,000 35,932,400 
NETFLIX INC  Yes 5.750% 4.337% 15-02-24 B1 411,000,000 17,825,070 
NETFLIX INC  Yes 5.375% 3.340% 15-02-21 B1 525,000,000 17,535,000 
     Total 2,473,500,000 98,026,520 
Weights 
For We, we picked up the market capitalization registered on 14th October 2016 on yahoofinance.com, which was USD 
43.55b. For Wd, we summed up the debt amount (Table 9) and the operating lease commitments. In the latter, we 
computed the present value of the operating leases (Table 10). The adjusted debt value was at the end of USD 2.89b. 
Given the values, the Enterprise value stood at USD 46.44b, with Equity weight of 93.8% and Debt weight of 6.2%. We 
are assuming that the current indebtedness corresponds to the target D/E in the long term. 
Table 10 | Present value of operating leases | Source: Netflix Form 10-K and H. Deepak analysis 
Corporate Tax 
We considered a corporate tax rate of 20.0% given the average level of tax paid in the last 2 years, which was 18.6%. 
We made a conservative adjustment and decided to add 1.4 pp.     
WACC 
Taking into consideration all the parameters mentioned above, our WACC was estimated at 9.93%. However, since we 
are working with constant prices, we had to take out the inflation values. Therefore, we accessed the IMF’s World 
Economic Outlook (WEO) – October 2016 data base to see the forecast of the world inflation rates until 2021. After 
extracting the values, we computed the compounded annual growth rate on the inflation rate and reached to a value of 
2.06%. At the end, taking out the expected inflation rate, our WACC was estimated at 7.30%. 
Terminal Growth  
For the terminal growth rate, we accessed the IMF’s WEO – October 2016 and extracted the World Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) estimates until 2021. Considering that Netflix does not operate in Crimea, North Korea and Syria, we 
deducted these countries’ GDP from the World GDP. After this process, we computed the compounded annual growth 
rate and reached to a value 4.35%. Since the World GDP estimated values were not available in constant prices, we, 
once again, had to take out the inflation rate computed above. At the end, and doing an adjustment of +0.50%, our 
estimated terminal growth rate stood at 2.74%.  
Valuation Period 
It would make sense to have an extended period of valuation due to the longevity of the industry in which the company 
operates, but for practical reasons, and being concerned about the technology changes, we considered a projected 
period of 5 years, from 1st January 2016 to 31st December 2021. The terminal value was added at the end of this period.
Year Commitment Present Value 
1 42,545,000 40,923,186 
2 54,811,000 50,711,860 
3 58,015,000 51,630,106 
4 53,152,000 45,499,145 
5 51,844,000 42,687,728 
Thereafter 269,377,000 186,623,089 






Netflix makes clear its intentions of international growth, sacrificing current 
margins for the benefit of higher international growth opportunities. Indeed, 
we estimated international revenues weight to be higher than the domestic 
ones for the next 5 years, not only due to an optimistic international 
performance but also to a moderation of the performance in the domestic 
market due to its high competition and threat of new entrants. 
Furthermore, despite of their contents being highly accepted in US, the 
Netflix’s content team producers have the responsibility to maintain the 
quality of the contents, and that, we believe, will somewhat get difficult as 
people become more demanding. For Domestic DVD, we admit that the 
company will still get revenues, however at a reduced level year over year, 
considering the fast penetration of streaming in the market and the 
advantages it brings to peoples’ daily life (Figure 55). In total, we expect 
Netflix to reach 150.3 million paid subscribers with a general MRPU of 
USD 9.1 cents by the end of 2021. The latter is expected to increase USD 
1.4 cents by 2019 and then stagnate until 2021 (Figures 56 & 59).   
 
From 2015 onwards, revenues are expected to gradually raise up to USD 
16.4b. A major part of the revenues will be from its international activities 
which by the end of 2019 will surpass domestic revenues. We expect by 
the end of 2021, International weight 57.1%, Domestic Streaming 41.0% 
and Domestic DVD 1.9% in total revenues (Figure 58).  
The contribution margin will show signs of recovery after its investments 
in 2015. Their international strategy will start to pay off. Thereby, gross 
profit and contribution margins should start to enlarge as effect of 
operational efficiency. As shown on the graph below, we expect the 














Figure 55 | Revenues growth by segment |  
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Figure 59 | Expected paid subscribers by segment 
| Numbers in millions | Source: H. Deepak analysis 
Figure 58 | Netflix expected segment weight | 
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Figure 57 | Estimated contribution margin |  
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Figure 56 | Expected MRPU |  
Source: H. Deepak analysis 
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Proceeding with our brief analysis on the forecast, we expect the level of 
revenues spent in contents to be maintained due to the management’s 
goal of having 50% of self-produced contents in its portfolio. Producing 
contents is more expensive than buying them. Notwithstanding, we are 
certain that the company will continue to buy contents externally produced 
to provide the best and the most complete package of contents to all 
subscribers. Maintaining the members happy will be the key for the future 
success. Additionally, we also took into consideration the competition the 
company faces, in which, is expected to further increase with new entrants 
on the market. They will look for contents and fight for exclusivity. Demand 
for contents will increase and will conduct to higher content prices. Given 
all the above, we forecasted our ratio (cash spent in contents / revenues) 
on an average of 64.6% (vs 64.1%) of revenues, which by the end of 2021, 
will correspond to USD 9.8b (Please refer to the figure 53 on page 19). To 
note that we only considered the average of cash spent on contents as a 
percentage of revenues in the last 2 years, due to the company’s 
expansion in 12 countries during that time (Appendix: Table 30).  
Return on Equity shows a downward trend, having registered 14.4% in 
2014 and 5.5% in 2015. According to our estimates, ROE will revert in 
2016 to the levels seen in 2013 of 9.4%, and then reach in 2021 to 23.9% 
(Figure 60 and Appendix: Table 21). Between 2018 and 2021, we expect 
the ROE to go down slowly as a result of the market requirements. Our 
predictions from 2018 onwards are that the market will be very demanding 
and that will affect the company’s operational expenses, which in turn will 
impact Net Income and deteriorate ROE. Based on that, our ROE for the 
next 5 years is as follows: 
Figure 60 | Netflix's ROE |  
Source: Netflix Form 10-K and H. Deepak analysis 
 


























Market Risk: Exchange rate Number 2 (yellow) on the graph. 
 
The company FX exposure is high as they recently began operating 
internationally. The finance department does not use hedging derivatives. 
Its FX exposure will rise as they move increasingly towards global 
licensing. In terms of impact, we classified the risk as ‘Medium’. 
 
Economic Risk: Competition Number 4 on the graph. 
The company is subject to high competition. The industry is expected to 
face partnerships, merges and acquisitions in the coming years, which will 
make competitors bigger. They will fight for exclusivity and there will be 
pressure in prices. This situation may lead the loss of market share. We 
classified it in terms of impact as ‘Medium/High’. 
Corporate Risk: Quality of originals Number 2 (green) on the graph. 
Despite of Netflix originals being highly rated and watched, the content 
management team will have the responsibility to maintain the quality of its 
contents to keep the subscribers happy. If nowadays people get excited 
on Netflix originals, in the future, subscribers will have even higher 
expectations. If their expectations do not meet the quality of contents, 
people will get rid of the service and affect badly the business. We 
classified this risk with ‘Low’ impact.  
Corporate Risk: Studios, content providers and other rights holders 
Number 2.5 on the graph. 
The company’s ability to provide members content of their interests other 
than its originals depends on studios, content providers and rights holders 
to distribute such content. If these players are no longer willing to license 
contents to the company, the business will be adversely affected and costs 
increase. We assess this as ‘Medium/High’ in terms of impact. 
Corporate Risk: Piracy Number 5 on the graph. 
Through new and existing distribution channels, consumers have 
increasing options to access entertainment video. One of the options is 
through pirate channels. Piracy is a threat to the business as it offers free 
content and it is subject to fast growth. In terms of impact, we classified 
this risk as ‘Critical’. 
Corporate Risk: Payment processing Number 1 on the graph. 
Netflix’s members pay for the service using a variety of payment methods, 
including credit and debit cards, gift cards etc. They rely on internal 
systems. Any disruptions in their payment processing systems or 
fraudulent usage of payment methods, their business could be adversely 
impacted. The impact is classified as ‘Medium/Low’. 
Corporate Risk: Amazon Web Services Number 3 on the graph. 
Amazon is Netflix’s main competitor but also its partner. Amazon provides 
a cloud computing service in which the company runs its business 
operations. Any interference with the use of the service would impact their 
operations. Despite being a competitor, Netflix does not believe Amazon 
will access information on the service to gain a competitive advantage 
against them. Given this, the impact is classified as ‘Medium/High’. 
Figure 61 | Netflix risk matrix |  
Source: H. Deepak analysis 
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RISKS TO PRICE TARGET
Sensitivity analysis 
A sensitivity analysis has been conducted to test our price target. The main variables chosen to test our price were the 
WACC and the Terminal Growth Rate. Our investment recommendation was decided in accordance with the ranges 
shown in the Table 11. The results have shown that out of 49 different outputs, 14 (28.6%) were for Strong Buy, 14 
(28.6%) for Buy, 7 (14.3%) for Hold/Neutral, 6 (12.6%) for Reduce and 8 (16.3%) for Sell (Table 12). 
Table 11 | Analyst's assessment |  
Source: H. Deepak analysis 
 
Intervals Recommendation 
Upside Potential  
($ 101.47) 
Weights on recommendation 
from Table 12 
] 147.13; +∞ [ Strong Buy > 45% 28.6% 
] $ 121.76; 147.13 ] Buy > 20% & ≤ 45% 28.6% 
] $ 111.62 ; $ 121.76 ] Hold/Neutral > 10% & ≤ 20% 14.3% 
] $ 101.47; $ 111.62 ] Reduce > 0% & ≤ 10% 12.6% 
] -∞; $ 101.47 ] Sell ≤ 0% 16.3% 
 
Table 12 | Changes in WACC and Terminal Growth Rate |  
Red - Sell, Orange - Reduce, Yellow - Hold/Neutral, Blue - Buy, Dark Blue - Strong Buy and Green - Price Target | 
Source: H. Deepak analysis 
 
























$ 125.57 6.00% 6.50% 7.00% 7.30% 7.50% 8.00% 8.50% 
1.50% $ 127.80 $ 115.17 $ 104.81 $ 99.39 $ 96.14 $ 88.78 $ 82.45 
2.00% $ 143.30 $ 127.58 $ 114.96 $ 108.46 $ 104.60 $ 95.94 $ 88.58 
2.50% $ 163.23 $ 143.08 $ 127.36 $ 119.42 $ 114.75 $ 104.40 $ 95.74 
2.74% $ 175.04 $ 152.04 $ 134.39 $ 125.57 $ 120.41 $ 109.05 $ 99.64 
3.00% $ 189.81 $ 163.01 $ 142.86 $ 132.93 $ 127.15 $ 114.54 $ 104.20 
3.50% $ 227.02 $ 189.59 $ 162.80 $ 149.98 $ 142.65 $ 126.95 $ 114.34 
4.00% $ 282.83 $ 226.80 $ 189.37 $ 172.21 $ 162.59 $ 142.45 $ 126.75 
 
Additionally to our sensitivity analysis, we have performed a Monte Carlo simulation covering 1,000 simulations to test 
our price target for 2017 with the variables previously mentioned. According to our simulation results, the mean price 
target was USD 124.80, which gave us the same recommendation as the DCF price target of USD 125.57 to a Buy.  
 
 













Sell Reduce Hold Buy Strong Buy
Figure 62 | Monte Carlo simulation |  
Red - Sell, Orange - Reduce, Yellow - Hold/Neutral, Blue – Buy and Dark Blue - Strong Buy | 
Source: H. Deepak analysis 
 
Figure 63 | Monte Carlo simulation |  
Red stands for Sell, Yellow stands for Hold and Blue stands for Buy | 
Source: H. Deepak analysis 
 
Figure 64 | Monte Carlo simulation |  
Red stands for Sell, Yellow stands for Hold and Blue stands for Buy | 
Source: H. Deepak analysis 
 
Figure 65 | Monte Carlo simulation |  
Red stands for Sell, Yellow stands for Hold and Blue stands for Buy | 





CONSOLIDATED INCOME STATEMENT 
 
Table 13 | Netflix's Consolidated Income Statement |  
 
 As of December 31 
In millions of dollars 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 
Total Paid Memberships 32.639 38.412 48.199 60.144 75.626 93.121 108.828 122.288 132.228 140.965 150.251 
ARPU in Netflix $ 98.2 $ 94.0 $ 90.8 $ 91.5 $ 89.6 $ 92.2 $ 97.6 $ 103.7 $ 109.2 $ 110.6 $ 109.2 
MRPU in Netflix $ 8.2 $ 7.8 $ 7.6 $ 7.6 $ 7.5 $ 7.7 $ 8.1 $ 8.6 $ 9.1 $ 9.2 $ 9.1 
            
Revenues 3,205 3,609 4,375 5,505 6,780 8,587 10,626 12,683 14,441 15,586 16,411 
Cost of Revenues (2,040) (2,626) (3,117) (3,753) (4,591) (5,727) (6,907) (7,990) (8,881) (9,352) (9,633) 
Gross Profit 1,165 983 1,257 1,752 2,188 2,859 3,719 4,693 5,560 6,234 6,778 
Marketing (403) (465) (470) (607) (824) (945) (1,009) (888) (1,011) (1,013) (1,067) 
Technology & Dev. (259) (329) (379) (472) (651) (816) (850) (761) (866) (857) (903) 
General & Administrative (127) (139) (180) (270) (407) (515) (478) (507) (578) (623) (656) 
EBIT 376 50 229 403 306 584 1,382 2,537 3,105 3,741 4,152 
Interest Expenses (20) (20) (29) (50) (133) (236) (292) (292) (334) (334) (328) 
Other Income/Expense 3 0 (28) (3) (31) (60) (111) (101) (31) (75) (42) 
EBT 360 31 171 350 142 289 979 2,144 2,741 3,333 3,783 
Income Tax Expense (133) (13) (59) (83) (19) (58) (196) (429) (548) (667) (757) 
Net Income 227 17 113 267 123 231 783 1,715 2,193 2,666 3,026 
 
Table 14 | CAGR 2011 - 2015 vs CAGR 2016-2021 - Income Statement figures |  
 
  Total Paid Memberships ARPU Revenues Gross Profit EBIT Net Income 
CAGR: 2011-2015 11.9% -2.5% 11.2% 10.1% -6.3% -37.0% 
CAGR: 2016-2021 6.7% 2.9% 8.1% 9.6% 13.2% 14.0% 
 
Table 15 | Netflix's Income Statement Size | 
 
  As of December 31 
In millions of dollars 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 
Revenues 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Cost of Revenues 63.7% 72.8% 71.3% 68.2% 67.7% 66.7% 65.0% 63.0% 61.5% 60.0% 58.7% 
Gross Profit 36.3% 27.2% 28.7% 31.8% 32.3% 33.3% 35.0% 37.0% 38.5% 40.0% 41.3% 
Marketing 12.6% 12.9% 10.7% 11.0% 12.2% 11.0% 9.5% 7.0% 7.0% 6.5% 6.5% 
Technology & Dev. 8.1% 9.1% 8.7% 8.6% 9.6% 9.5% 8.0% 6.0% 6.0% 5.5% 5.5% 
General & Administrative 4.0% 3.9% 4.1% 4.9% 6.0% 6.0% 4.5% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 
EBIT 11.7% 1.4% 5.2% 7.3% 4.5% 6.8% 13.0% 20.0% 21.5% 24.0% 25.3% 
Interest Expenses 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.9% 2.0% 2.7% 2.7% 2.3% 2.3% 2.1% 2.0% 
Other Income/Expense -0.1% 0.0% 0.6% 0.1% 0.5% 0.7% 1.0% 0.8% 0.2% 0.5% 0.3% 
EBT 11.2% 0.9% 3.9% 6.4% 2.1% 3.4% 9.2% 16.9% 19.0% 21.4% 23.0% 
Income Tax Expense 4.2% 0.4% 1.3% 1.5% 0.3% 0.7% 1.8% 3.4% 3.8% 4.3% 4.6% 






CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET 
 
Table 16 | Netflix's Consolidated Balance Sheet | 
 
  As of December 31  
 In millions of dollars  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 
Non-Current Content Assets  1,047 1,506 2,091 2,773 4,313 6,194 7,949 9,846 11,317 12,360 13,370 
Property & Equipment, Net  136 132 134 150 173 186 204 227 247 259 257 
Other Non-Current Assets  55 89 129 192 285 343 425 507 578 623 656 
Total Non-Current Assets  1,238 1,727 2,354 3,115 4,771 6,723 8,578 10,580 12,142 13,243 14,284 
Cash & Cash Equivalents  508 290 605 1,114 1,809 1,461 1,481 2,229 3,373 5,845 7,774 
Short-Term Investments  290 458 595 495 501 429 638 634 866 779 985 
Current Content Assets  920 1,368 1,706 2,166 2,906 4,130 5,299 6,564 7,545 8,240 8,913 
Other Current Assets  113 125 152 152 215 258 319 254 289 312 328 
Total Current Assets  1,831 2,241 3,059 3,927 5,432 6,277 7,736 9,681 12,073 15,177 18,000 
Total Assets  3,069 3,968 5,413 7,043 10,203 13,001 16,314 20,261 24,215 28,419 32,284 
Preferred Stock  - - - - - - - - - - - 
Common Stock  0 0 0 1,043 1,325 1,325 1,325 1,325 1,325 1,325 1,325 
Additional Paid-In Capital  219 302 777 - - - - - - - - 
Acc. Other Comprehensive Loss  1 3 4 (4) (43) (43) (13) 7 7 7 7 
Retained Earnings  423 440 552 819 942 1,173 1,956 3,671 5,864 8,530 11,556 
Total Equity  643 745 1,334 1,858 2,223 2,454 3,268 5,003 7,196 9,862 12,888 
Non-Current Content Liabilities  740 1,077 1,346 1,576 2,026 2,864 3,304 4,235 5,019 5,053 5,325 
Long-Term Debt  400 400 500 886 2,371 3,371 4,171 4,171 4,171 4,171 4,106 
Other Non-Current Liabilities  62 71 79 60 52 86 106 127 144 156 164 
Total Non-Current Liabilities  1,201 1,547 1,925 2,522 4,450 6,322 7,581 8,533 9,334 9,380 9,595 
Current Content Liabilities  925 1,367 1,776 2,117 2,789 3,224 4,023 5,036 5,632 6,538 6,711 
Accounts Payable  88 86 108 202 253 314 378 547 608 769 792 
Accrued Expenses   64 53 54 70 140 258 425 380 578 779 985 
Deferred Revenue  149 169 216 275 347 429 638 761 866 1,091 1,313 
Total Current Liabilities  1,225 1,676 2,154 2,663 3,530 4,225 5,464 6,724 7,685 9,177 9,801 
Total Liabilities  2,426 3,223 4,079 5,185 7,979 10,546 13,046 15,258 17,019 18,557 19,396 
Total Equity & Liabilities  3,069 3,968 5,413 7,043 10,203 13,001 16,314 20,261 24,215 28,419 32,284 
 
Table 17 | CAGR 2011 - 2015 vs CAGR 2016-2021 - Balance Sheet Assets figures |  
 
  Non-Current Content Assets Current Content Assets Cash & Cash Equivalents Total Assets 
CAGR: 2011-2015 15.1% 13.9% 14.5% 14.2% 
CAGR: 2016-2021 9.0% 9.0% 12.6% 9.8% 
 
 
Table 18 | CAGR 2011 - 2015 vs CAGR 2016-2021 - Balance Sheet Liabilities figures |  
 
  Total Equity Non-Current Content Liabilities Current Content Liabilities Long-Term Debt Total Liabilities 
CAGR: 2011-2015 14.4% 13.1% 13.7% 16.3% 14.1% 







Table 19 | Netflix's Balance Sheet Size | 
 
  As of December 31  
 In millions of dollars  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 
Non-Current Content Assets  34.1% 38.0% 38.6% 39.4% 42.3% 47.6% 48.7% 48.6% 46.7% 43.5% 41.4% 
Property & Equipment, Net  4.4% 3.3% 2.5% 2.1% 1.7% 1.4% 1.3% 1.1% 1.0% 0.9% 0.8% 
Other Non-Current Assets  1.8% 2.3% 2.4% 2.7% 2.8% 2.6% 2.6% 2.5% 2.4% 2.2% 2.0% 
Total Non-Current Assets  40.3% 43.5% 43.5% 44.2% 46.8% 51.7% 52.6% 52.2% 50.1% 46.6% 44.2% 
Cash & Cash Equivalents  16.6% 7.3% 11.2% 15.8% 17.7% 11.2% 9.1% 11.0% 13.9% 20.6% 24.1% 
Short-Term Investments  9.4% 11.5% 11.0% 7.0% 4.9% 3.3% 3.9% 3.1% 3.6% 2.7% 3.1% 
Current Content Assets  30.0% 34.5% 31.5% 30.8% 28.5% 31.8% 32.5% 32.4% 31.2% 29.0% 27.6% 
Other Current Assets  3.7% 3.1% 2.8% 2.2% 2.1% 2.0% 2.0% 1.3% 1.2% 1.1% 1.0% 
Total Current Assets  59.7% 56.5% 56.5% 55.8% 53.2% 48.3% 47.4% 47.8% 49.9% 53.4% 55.8% 
Total Assets  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Preferred Stock  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Common Stock  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 14.8% 13.0% 10.2% 8.1% 6.5% 5.5% 4.7% 4.1% 
Additional Paid-In Capital  7.1% 7.6% 14.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Acc. Other Comprehensive Loss  0.0% 0.1% 0.1% -0.1% -0.4% -0.3% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Retained Earnings  13.8% 11.1% 10.2% 11.6% 9.2% 9.0% 12.0% 18.1% 24.2% 30.0% 35.8% 
Total Equity  20.9% 18.8% 24.6% 26.4% 21.8% 18.9% 20.0% 24.7% 29.7% 34.7% 39.9% 
Non-Current Content Liabilities  24.1% 27.1% 24.9% 22.4% 19.9% 22.0% 20.2% 20.9% 20.7% 17.8% 16.5% 
Long-Term Debt  13.0% 10.1% 9.2% 12.6% 23.2% 25.9% 25.6% 20.6% 17.2% 14.7% 12.7% 
Other Non-Current Liabilities  2.0% 1.8% 1.5% 0.9% 0.5% 0.7% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 
Total Non-Current Liabilities  39.1% 39.0% 35.6% 35.8% 43.6% 48.6% 46.5% 42.1% 38.5% 33.0% 29.7% 
Current Content Liabilities  30.1% 34.4% 32.8% 30.1% 27.3% 24.8% 24.7% 24.9% 23.3% 23.0% 20.8% 
Accounts Payable  2.9% 2.2% 2.0% 2.9% 2.5% 2.4% 2.3% 2.7% 2.5% 2.7% 2.5% 
Accrued Expenses   2.1% 1.3% 1.0% 1.0% 1.4% 2.0% 2.6% 1.9% 2.4% 2.7% 3.1% 
Deferred Revenue  4.8% 4.3% 4.0% 3.9% 3.4% 3.3% 3.9% 3.8% 3.6% 3.8% 4.1% 
Total Current Liabilities  39.9% 42.2% 39.8% 37.8% 34.6% 32.5% 33.5% 33.2% 31.7% 32.3% 30.4% 
Total Liabilities  79.1% 81.2% 75.4% 73.6% 78.2% 81.1% 80.0% 75.3% 70.3% 65.3% 60.1% 


















CONSOLIDATED CASH FLOW STATEMENT  
 
Table 20 | Netflix's Consolidated Cash Flow Statement |  
 
 As of December 31 
In millions of dollars 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 
Net income  226 17 112 267 123 231 783 1,715 2,193 2,666 3,026 
Additions to Streaming Cont. Assets (2,321) (2,516) (3,031) (3,773) (5,772) (7,792) (8,571) (9,428) (9,899) (10,147) (10,147) 
Change in Streaming Cont. Liabilities 
  
1,460 762 674 593 1,162 1,137 1,133 1,818 1,235 795 300 
Amortization of Streaming Cont. Assets 699 1,591 2,122 2,656 3,405 4,658 5,607 6,215 7,459 8,416 8,477 
Amortization of DVD Cont. Assets 97 65 71 72 79 95 114 127 75 85 86 
D&A of property, equipment & Intangibles 44 45 48 54 62 74 88 104 124 144 166 
Stock-based Compensation Expense 62 74 73 115 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 
Excess Tax Benefits from  
Stock-based Compensation 
(46) (5) (82) (89) (80) (60) (60) (60) (60) (60) (60) 
Other Non-Cash Items (4) 8 5 15 32 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Loss on Extinguishment of Debt - - 25 - - - - - - - - 
Deferred Taxes (19) (30) (22) (30) (59) (59) (59) (59) (59) (59) (59) 
Other Current Assets (5) (5) 43 (9) 19 (42) (61) 65 (35) (23) (17) 
Accounts Payable 24 (5) 18 84 52 60 65 169 61 160 23 
Accrued Expenses 75 10 2 56 49 117 167 (45) 197 202 205 
Deferred Revenue 22 21 46 59 72 83 208 123 105 225 222 
Other Non-Current Assets & Liabilities 
 
3 5 (9) (52) (18) (25) (61) (62) (53) (34) (25) 
Cash Flow from Operating Activities 318 38 98 17 (749) (1,298) (421) 908 1,568 2,596 2,423 
 
Acquisition of DVD Cont. Assets 
(85) (48) (66) (75) (78) (67) (74) (76) (87) (94) (98) 
 
Purchases of Property & Equipment 
(50) (40) (54) (70) (91) (86) (106) (127) (144) (156) (164) 
 
Other Assets 
4 9 6 1 (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) 
 
Purchases of Short-term Investments 
(224) (477) (550) (427) (372) (352) (626) (521) (782) (452) (582) 
 
Proceeds from Sale of  
Short-term Investments 
51 283 348 385 259 284 303 378 451 345 281 
 
Proceeds from Maturities  
of Short-term Investments 
 
38 29 61 142 105 140 115 146 99 194 96 
Cash Flow from Investing Activities (266) (245) (256) (43) (179) (82) (391) (201) (465) (164) (470) 
 
Proceeds from Issuance of Common Stock 
20 4 125 61 78 - - - - - - 
 
Proceeds from Public Offerings 
200 (0) - - - - - - - - - 
 
Proceeds from Issuance of Debt 
198 (0) 500 400 1,500 1,000 800 - - - - 
 
Issuance Costs 
- - (9) (7) (18) (11) (10) - - - - 
 
Repurchases of Common Stock 
(200) - - - - - - - - - - 
 
Redemption of Debt 
- - (219) - - - - - - - (66) 
 
Excess Tax Benefits from  
Stock-based Compensation 
46 5 82 89 80 60 60 60 60 60 60 
 
Principal Payments of  
Lease Financing Obligations  
 
(2) (2) (1) (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (3) (3) 
Cash Flow from Financing Activities 262 6 476 542 1,640 1,048 848 57 57 57 (9) 
Exchange Rate Effects - (0) (3) (7) (16) (16) (16) (16) (16) (16) (16) 
Net Change in Cash & Cash Equivalents 314 (201) 315 509 696 (348) 20 748 1,144 2,472 1,928 
Beginning Cash & Cash Equivalents 194 491 290 605 1,114 1,809 1,461 1,481 2,229 3,373 5,845 






RETURN ON EQUITY 
 
Table 21 | Netflix's DuPont Identity | 
 
  As of December 31  
In millions of dollars 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 
 Net Income  226 17 112 267 123 231 783 1,715 2,193 2,666 3,026 
 Revenues  3,205 3,609 4,375 5,505 6,780 8,587 10,626 12,683 14,441 15,586 16,411 
 Net Profit Margin   7.1% 0.5% 2.6% 4.8% 1.8% 2.7% 7.4% 13.5% 15.2% 17.1% 18.4% 
            
 Net Income  226 17 112 267 123 231 783 1,715 2,193 2,666 3,026 
 EBT  360 30 171 349 142 289 979 2,144 2,741 3,333 3,783 
 Tax Burden (1 - tax rate)  62.9% 56.3% 65.7% 76.4% 86.4% 80.0% 80.0% 80.0% 80.0% 80.0% 80.0% 
            
 EBT  360 30 171 349 142 289 979 2,144 2,741 3,333 3,783 
 EBIT  376 50 228 403 306 584 1,382 2,537 3,105 3,741 4,152 
 Interest Burden   95.6% 61.0% 74.9% 86.8% 46.4% 49.4% 70.9% 84.5% 88.3% 89.1% 91.1% 
            
 EBIT  376 50 228 403 306 584 1,382 2,537 3,105 3,741 4,152 
 Revenues  3,205 3,609 4,375 5,505 6,780 8,587 10,626 12,683 14,441 15,586 16,411 
 EBIT Margin  11.7% 1.4% 5.2% 7.3% 4.5% 6.8% 13.0% 20.0% 21.5% 24.0% 25.3% 
            
 Revenues  3,205 3,609 4,375 5,505 6,780 8,587 10,626 12,683 14,441 15,586 16,411 
 Total Assets  3,069 3,968 5,413 7,043 10,203 13,001 16,314 20,261 24,215 28,419 32,284 
 Asset Turnover  1.0x 0.9x 0.8x 0.8x 0.7x 0.7x 0.7x 0.6x 0.6x 0.5x 0.5x 
            
 Total Assets  3,069 3,968 5,413 7,043 10,203 13,001 16,314 20,261 24,215 28,419 32,284 
 Total Equity  643 745 1,334 1,858 2,223 2,454 3,268 5,003 7,196 9,862 12,888 
 Leverage  4.8x 5.3x 4.1x 3.8x 4.6x 5.3x 5.0x 4.0x 3.4x 2.9x 2.5x 
            
 Return on Equity  35.2% 2.3% 8.4% 14.4% 5.5% 9.4% 24.0% 34.3% 30.5% 27.0% 23.5% 
























KEY FINANCIAL RATIOS 
 
Table 22 | Netflix's Key Financial Ratios |  
 
 As of December 31 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 
Efficiency            
Asset Turnover 1.04 0.91 0.81 0.78 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.63 0.60 0.55 0.51 
            
Payables Period 15.8 12.1 12.7 19.6 20.2 20.1 20.0 25.0 25.0 30.1 30.0 
Payables Turnover 23.2 30.4 28.7 18.6 18.1 18.3 18.3 14.6 14.6 12.2 12.2 
            
Cash Conversion  
Cycle 
(15.8) (12.1) (12.7) (19.6) (20.2) (20.1) (20.0) (25.0) (25.0) (30.1) (30.0) 
            
Activity 
 
           
Capex / Amortization  
of Contents 
 
1.19 1.09 1.10 1.19 1.35 1.40 1.30 1.20 1.15 1.10 1.15 
Marketing Expenses  
(As a % of Revenues) 
12.6% 12.9% 10.7% 11.0% 12.2% 11.0% 9.5% 7.0% 7.0% 6.5% 6.5% 
 
Technology and Dev.  
(As a % of Revenues) 
8.1% 9.1% 8.7% 8.6% 9.6% 9.5% 8.0% 6.0% 6.0% 5.5% 5.5% 
 
General and Adm. 
(As a % of Revenues) 
4.0% 3.9% 4.1% 4.9% 6.0% 6.0% 4.5% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 
            
Liquidity            
Current Ratio 149% 134% 142% 147% 154% 149% 142% 144% 157% 165% 184% 
Cash Ratio 65% 45% 56% 60% 65% 45% 39% 43% 55% 72% 89% 
            
Profitability            
Gross Profit Margin 36.3% 27.2% 28.7% 31.8% 32.3% 33.3% 35.0% 37.0% 38.5% 40.0% 41.3% 
EBIT Margin 11.7% 1.4% 5.2% 7.3% 4.5% 6.8% 13.0% 20.0% 21.5% 24.0% 25.3% 
Net Profit Margin 7.1% 0.5% 2.6% 4.8% 1.8% 2.7% 7.4% 13.5% 15.2% 17.1% 18.4% 
ROE 35.2% 2.3% 8.4% 14.4% 5.5% 9.4% 24.0% 34.3% 30.5% 27.0% 23.5% 
ROA 7.4% 0.4% 2.1% 3.8% 1.2% 1.8% 4.8% 8.5% 9.1% 9.4% 9.4% 
ROCE 20.4% 2.2% 7.0% 9.2% 4.6% 6.7% 12.7% 18.7% 18.8% 19.4% 18.5% 
EPS $ 0.59 $ 0.04 $ 0.27 $ 0.62 $ 0.28 $ 0.52 $ 1.76 $ 3.81 $ 4.82 $ 5.81 $ 6.52 
            
Debt            
Equity Ratio 20.9% 18.8% 24.6% 26.4% 21.8% 18.9% 20.0% 24.7% 29.7% 34.7% 39.9% 
 
Total Liabilities to  
Equity Ratio 
3.8x 4.3x 3.1x 2.8x 3.6x 4.3x 4.0x 3.0x 2.4x 1.9x 1.5x 
 
Interest Coverage  
Ratio 
18.78 2.50 7.84 8.02 2.30 2.48 4.73 8.69 9.31 11.21 12.64 
 
Long-term Debt  
over Total Assets 
13.0% 10.1% 9.2% 12.6% 23.2% 25.9% 25.6% 20.6% 17.2% 14.7% 12.7% 
 
Long-term Debt  
over Equity (Debt-to-Equity 
Ratio) 















UNLEVERED FREE CASH FLOW 
 
Table 23 | Netflix's DCF | 
 
  As of December 31 
In millions 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 
       
Expected Paid Memberships in Domestic Streaming 47.910 51.743 54.847 57.041 58.753 60.221 
Expected Annual ARPU $ 104.7 $ 111.5 $ 115.7 $ 116.8 $ 114.5 $ 111.7 
Expected Monthly ARPU $ 8.7 $ 9.3 $ 9.6 $ 9.7 $ 9.5 $ 9.3 
       
Expected Paid Memberships in International Streaming 41.190 53.547 64.256 72.288 79.517 87.469 
Expected Annual ARPU $ 73.5 $ 82.0 $ 92.2 $ 102.5 $ 107.1 $ 107.1 
Expected Monthly ARPU $ 6.1 $ 6.8 $ 7.7 $ 8.5 $ 8.9 $ 8.9 
       
Expected Paid Memberships in Domestic DVD 4.021 3.539 3.185 2.898 2.695 2.560 
Expected Annual ARPU $ 134.9 $ 131.8 $ 128.9 $ 127.5 $ 124.7 $ 120.8 
Expected Monthly ARPU $ 11.2 $ 11.0 $ 10.7 $ 10.6 $ 10.4 $ 10.1 
       
Revenues in Domestic Streaming  5,016 5,769 6,346 6,663 6,730 6,730 
Revenues in International Streaming  3,028 4,390 5,927 7,409 8,520 9,372 
Revenues in Domestic DVD 542 466 411 369 336 309 
       
Total Revenues 8,587 10,626 12,683 14,441 15,586 16,411 
       
Cost of Revenues  (5,727) (6,907) (7,990) (8,881) (9,352) (9,633) 
       
Gross Profit 2,859 3,719 4,693 5,560 6,234 6,778 
       
Marketing Expenses (945) (1,009) (888) (1,011) (1,013) (1,067) 
Technology and Development (816) (850) (761) (866) (857) (903) 
General & Administrative (515) (478) (507) (578) (623) (656) 
       
Operating Income (EBIT) 584 1,381 2,537 3,105 3,741 4,152 
       
Corporate Tax (117) (276) (507) (621) (748) (830) 
       
EBIT (1 - Tax) 467 1,105 2,029 2,484 2,992 3,322 
       
Amortizations of Contents 4,753 5,722 6,342 7,535 8,501 8,562 
D&A of Property, Equipment & Intangibles 74 88 104 124 144 166 
       
Cash Spent in Contents (6,655) (7,438) (7,610) (8,665) (9,352) (9,847) 
Purchases of Property & Equipment (86) (106) (127) (144) (156) (164) 
       
Changes in Working Capital 193 318 251 276 529 409 
       




WEIGHTED AVERAGE COST OF CAPITAL 
 
Table 24 | Historical prices of MSCI and NFLX |  
Source: yahoofinance.com 








Date Adj Close Return Plus 1  Adj Close Return  Difference Difference  
01-12-16 $    59.17 2.0% 1.019623  $ 123.80 5.8%  2.8% -1.1%  
01-11-16 $    58.03 1.0% 1.01035  $ 117.00 -6.3%  -9.4% -2.0%  
03-10-16 $    57.44 -1.9% 0.98088  $ 124.87 26.7%  23.6% -5.0%  
01-09-16 $    58.56 0.9% 1.009394  $    98.55 1.1%  -1.9% -2.1%  
01-08-16 $    58.01 0.3% 1.003428  $    97.45 6.8%  3.7% -2.7%  
01-07-16 $    57.81 3.8% 1.037702  $    91.25 -0.3%  -3.3% 0.7%  
01-06-16 $    55.71 0.0% 0.999503  $    91.48 -10.8%  -13.9% -3.1%  
02-05-16 $    55.74 0.3% 1.003344  $ 102.57 13.9%  10.9% -2.7%  
01-04-16 $    55.55 1.3% 1.013379  $    90.03 -11.9%  -15.0% -1.7%  
01-03-16 $    54.82 7.4% 1.073946  $ 102.23 9.4%  6.4% 4.3%  
01-02-16 $    51.05 -1.2% 0.987514  $    93.41 1.7%  -1.4% -4.3%  
04-01-16 $    51.69 -5.3% 0.946972  $    91.84 -19.7%  -22.8% -8.4%  
01-12-15 $    54.59 -2.1% 0.978942  $ 114.38 -7.3%  -10.3% -5.2%  
02-11-15 $    55.76 -0.5% 0.994662  $ 123.33 13.8%  10.7% -3.6%  
01-10-15 $    56.06 7.7% 1.076567  $ 108.38 5.0%  1.9% 4.6%  
01-09-15 $    52.07 -3.4% 0.965628  $ 103.26 -10.2%  -13.3% -6.5%  
03-08-15 $    53.93 -6.8% 0.931932  $ 115.03 0.6%  -2.4% -9.9%  
01-07-15 $    57.87 0.8% 1.008242  $ 114.31 21.8%  18.7% -2.2%  
01-06-15 $    57.39 -2.6% 0.974217  $    93.85 5.3%  2.2% -5.6%  
01-05-15 $    58.91 0.0% 1.000000  $    89.15 12.1%  9.1% -3.1%  
01-04-15 $    58.91 2.9% 1.028657  $    79.50 33.6%  30.5% -0.2%  
02-03-15 $    57.27 -1.5% 0.985388  $    59.53 -12.3%  -15.3% -4.5%  
02-02-15 $    58.12 5.5% 1.055084  $    67.84 7.5%  4.4% 2.4%  
02-01-15 $    55.08 -1.3% 0.986838  $    63.11 29.3%  26.3% -4.4%  
01-12-14 $    55.82 -2.4% 0.976423  $    48.80 -1.4%  -4.5% -5.4%  
03-11-14 $    57.17 1.4% 1.013756  $    49.51 -11.8%  -14.8% -1.7%  
01-10-14 $    56.39 1.2% 1.012054  $    56.11 -12.9%  -16.0% -1.9%  
02-09-14 $    55.72 -3.3% 0.966842  $    64.45 -5.5%  -8.6% -6.4%  
01-08-14 $    57.63 2.6% 1.025762  $    68.23 13.0%  9.9% -0.5%  
01-07-14 $    56.18 -1.4% 0.985563  $    60.39 -4.1%  -7.1% -4.5%  
02-06-14 $    57.01 1.8% 1.018182  $    62.94 5.4%  2.4% -1.2%  
01-05-14 $    55.99 2.0% 1.020058  $    59.69 29.7%  26.7% -1.1%  
01-04-14 $    54.89 1.2% 1.011868  $    46.01 -8.5%  -11.6% -1.9%  
03-03-14 $    54.24 0.6% 1.005708  $    50.29 -21.0%  -24.1% -2.5%  
03-02-14 $    53.94 5.2% 1.052047  $    63.66 8.9%  5.8% 2.1%  



















Date Adj Close Return Plus 1  Adj Close Return  Difference Difference 
02-12-13 $    53.76 2.1% 1.020692  $    52.60 0.6%  -2.4% -1.0%  
01-11-13 $    52.67 1.6% 1.015522  $    52.26 13.4%  10.4% -1.5%  
01-10-13 $    51.86 4.0% 1.039503  $    46.07 4.3%  1.2% 0.9%  
03-09-13 $    49.89 5.5% 1.055392  $    44.17 8.9%  5.9% 2.5%  
01-08-13 $    47.27 -2.3% 0.977051  $    40.56 16.1%  13.1% -5.4%  
01-07-13 $    48.38 4.6% 1.0458  $    34.93 15.8%  12.8% 1.5%  
03-06-13 $    46.27 -2.6% 0.973983  $    30.16 -6.7%  -9.8% -5.7%  
01-05-13 $    47.50 -0.4% 0.996168  $    32.32 4.7%  1.7% -3.4%  
01-04-13 $    47.68 2.8% 1.028374  $    30.87 14.2%  11.1% -0.2%  
01-03-13 $    46.37 1.8% 1.018258  $    27.04 0.6%  -2.4% -1.2%  
01-02-13 $    45.54 -0.1% 0.998998  $    26.87 13.8%  10.8% -3.2%  
02-01-13 $    45.58 3.8% 1.037645  $    23.61 78.5%  75.4% 0.7%  
03-12-12 $    43.93 2.9% 1.029041  $    13.23 13.3%  10.3% -0.2%  
01-11-12 $    42.69 1.6% 1.015931  $    11.67 3.1%  0.1% -1.5%  
01-10-12 $    42.02 -0.5% 0.99486  $    11.32 45.6%  42.5% -3.6%  
04-09-12 $    42.24 2.7% 1.027057  $      7.78 -8.8%  -11.9% -0.4%  
01-08-12 $    41.12 2.8% 1.027809  $      8.53 5.0%  2.0% -0.3%  
02-07-12 $    40.01 0.8% 1.008206  $      8.12 -17.0%  -20.1% -2.2%  
01-06-12 $    39.69 5.1% 1.050723  $      9.78 8.0%  4.9% 2.0%  
01-05-12 $    37.77 -9.3% 0.907201  $      9.06 -20.8%  -23.9% -12.3%  
02-04-12 $    41.63 -1.1% 0.988559  $    11.45 -30.3%  -33.4% -4.2%  
01-03-12 $    42.12 1.1% 1.01114  $    16.43 3.9%  0.8% -1.9%  
01-02-12 $    41.65 4.9% 1.04946  $    15.82 -7.9%  -10.9% 1.9%  
03-01-12 $    39.69    $    17.17      
 
Table 25 | World Inflation | 




Table 26 | World Gross Domestic Product |  
Source: IMF's World Economic Outlook data base, October 2016 
 
Current Prices As of December 31  
In billions of dollars 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021  
World      75,213       79,536       83,811        88,539       93,599       98,632   
 Syria          75.21          79.54          83.81          88.54          93.60          98.63   
        
Korea   1,404.38    1,521.00    1,591.30    1,668.97    1,746.81    1,819.34   
North Korea         19.56          20.68          21.79          23.02          24.34          25.64   
South Korea   1,384.83    1,500.32    1,569.51    1,645.95    1,722.48    1,793.69   
       CAGR 
Total World GDP excluding North Korea and Syria      75,118       79,436       83,706        88,428       93,481       98,508  4.35% 
 
 
Consumer Prices Index (average) As of December 31  
% 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 CAGR 
World Inflation 2.90% 3.28% 3.28% 3.23% 3.27% 3.25% 2.06% 
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Table 27 | Beta Calculation |  
Source: yahoofinance.com 
 
 Netflix, Inc.  MSCI ACWI  
Date Adj Close Return  Adj Close Return Plus 1 
10-10-16 $ 101.47 -3.2%  $ 57.48 -1.3% 0.99 
03-10-16 $ 104.82 6.4%  $ 58.22 -0.6% 0.99 
26-09-16 $ 98.55 2.7%  $ 58.56 -0.1% 1.00 
19-09-16 $ 95.94 -3.6%  $ 58.59 2.2% 1.02 
12-09-16 $ 99.48 3.1%  $ 57.30 -0.4% 1.00 
06-09-16 $ 96.50 -0.9%  $ 57.55 -1.9% 0.98 
29-08-16 $ 97.38 -0.2%  $ 58.68 1.0% 1.01 
22-08-16 $ 97.58 1.8%  $ 58.09 -0.9% 0.99 
15-08-16 $ 95.87 -0.7%  $ 58.63 0.1% 1.00 
08-08-16 $ 96.59 -0.5%  $ 58.58 1.2% 1.01 
01-08-16 $ 97.03 6.3%  $ 57.90 0.2% 1.00 
25-07-16 $ 91.25 6.2%  $ 57.81 0.7% 1.01 
18-07-16 $ 85.89 -12.7%  $ 57.43 0.4% 1.00 
11-07-16 $ 98.39 1.4%  $ 57.18 2.2% 1.02 
05-07-16 $ 97.06 0.4%  $ 55.94 0.2% 1.00 
27-06-16 $ 96.67 9.3%  $ 55.83 3.8% 1.04 
20-06-16 $ 88.44 -6.4%  $ 53.80 -1.9% 0.98 
13-06-16 $ 94.45 0.7%  $ 54.85 -1.1% 0.99 
06-06-16 $ 93.75 -5.9%  $ 55.46 -1.1% 0.99 
31-05-16 $ 99.59 -3.6%  $ 56.07 0.4% 1.00 
23-05-16 $ 103.30 11.7%  $ 55.88 2.2% 1.02 
16-05-16 $ 92.49 5.2%  $ 54.66 0.5% 1.01 
09-05-16 $ 87.88 -3.3%  $ 54.37 -0.7% 0.99 
02-05-16 $ 90.84 0.9%  $ 54.74 -1.5% 0.99 
25-04-16 $ 90.03 -6.1%  $ 55.55 -1.2% 0.99 
18-04-16 $ 95.90 -14.0%  $ 56.24 1.1% 1.01 
11-04-16 $ 111.51 7.4%  $ 55.64 2.4% 1.02 
04-04-16 $ 103.81 -1.8%  $ 54.32 -0.8% 0.99 
28-03-16 $ 105.70 7.5%  $ 54.78 1.4% 1.01 
21-03-16 $ 98.36 -2.7%  $ 54.01 -1.4% 0.99 
14-03-16 $ 101.12 3.5%  $ 54.76 1.2% 1.01 
07-03-16 $ 97.66 -3.9%  $ 54.14 1.5% 1.01 
29-02-16 $ 101.58 7.2%  $ 53.35 4.0% 1.04 
22-02-16 $ 94.79 6.2%  $ 51.32 0.9% 1.01 
16-02-16 $ 89.23 2.1%  $ 50.87 3.2% 1.03 
08-02-16 $ 87.40 5.6%  $ 49.28 -1.8% 0.98 
01-02-16 $ 82.79 -9.9%  $ 50.19 -2.9% 0.97 
25-01-16 $ 91.84 -8.8%  $ 51.69 2.0% 1.02 
19-01-16 $ 100.72 -3.2%  $ 50.67 2.0% 1.02 
11-01-16 $ 104.04 -6.6%  $ 49.66 -2.7% 0.97 
04-01-16 $ 111.39 -2.6%  $ 51.03 -6.5% 0.93 
28-12-15 $ 114.38 -2.5%  $ 54.59 -1.1% 0.99 
21-12-15 $ 117.33 -0.6%  $ 55.19 2.9% 1.03 
14-12-15 $ 118.02 -0.7%  $ 53.64 0.3% 1.00 
07-12-15 $ 118.91 -9.2%  $ 53.50 -4.3% 0.96 
30-11-15 $ 130.93 4.4%  $ 55.92 0.0% 1.00 
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23-11-15 $ 125.44 1.3%  $ 55.92 -0.4% 1.00 
16-11-15 $ 123.84 19.5%  $ 56.13 3.1% 1.03 
09-11-15 $ 103.65 -9.1%  $ 54.46 -3.4% 0.97 
02-11-15 $ 114.06 5.2%  $ 56.36 0.5% 1.01 
26-10-15 $ 108.38 8.3%  $ 56.06 -0.8% 0.99 
19-10-15 $ 100.04 1.1%  $ 56.49 1.5% 1.01 
12-10-15 $ 98.99 -12.7%  $ 55.66 0.8% 1.01 
05-10-15 $ 113.33 6.8%  $ 55.23 4.0% 1.04 
28-09-15 $ 106.11 3.8%  $ 53.09 1.6% 1.02 
21-09-15 $ 102.24 -0.4%  $ 52.26 -2.0% 0.98 
14-09-15 $ 102.62 5.2%  $ 53.34 -0.3% 1.00 
08-09-15 $ 97.51 -1.3%  $ 53.50 2.5% 1.03 
31-08-15 $ 98.79 -16.0%  $ 52.18 -4.0% 0.96 
24-08-15 $ 117.63 13.1%  $ 54.35 1.3% 1.01 
17-08-15 $ 103.96 -15.7%  $ 53.64 -6.3% 0.94 
10-08-15 $ 123.39 -0.1%  $ 57.24 -0.3% 1.00 
03-08-15 $ 123.52 8.1%  $ 57.38 -0.8% 0.99 
27-07-15 $ 114.31 4.5%  $ 57.87 0.9% 1.01 
20-07-15 $ 109.34 -4.7%  $ 57.32 -2.3% 0.98 
13-07-15 $ 114.77 18.0%  $ 58.69 1.8% 1.02 
06-07-15 $ 97.23 3.4%  $ 57.65 -0.2% 1.00 
29-06-15 $ 94.04 1.0%  $ 57.78 -1.7% 0.98 
22-06-15 $ 93.09 -0.8%  $ 58.79 0.3% 1.00 
15-06-15 $ 93.87 -0.6%  $ 58.61 0.2% 1.00 
08-06-15 $ 94.42 4.4%  $ 58.50 0.4% 1.00 
01-06-15 $ 90.46 1.5%  $ 58.25 -1.1% 0.99 
26-05-15 $ 89.15 0.4%  $ 58.91 -1.6% 0.98 
18-05-15 $ 88.84 1.4%  $ 59.87 -0.3% 1.00 
11-05-15 $ 87.61 6.7%  $ 60.03 0.7% 1.01 
04-05-15 $ 82.09 3.2%  $ 59.61 0.3% 1.00 
27-04-15 $ 79.58 -0.2%  $ 59.45 -0.6% 0.99 
20-04-15 $ 79.77 -2.3%  $ 59.78 2.0% 1.02 
13-04-15 $ 81.65 25.7%  $ 58.61 -0.7% 0.99 
06-04-15 $ 64.94 9.8%  $ 59.03 2.1% 1.02 
30-03-15 $ 59.15 -0.2%  $ 57.79 0.7% 1.01 
23-03-15 $ 59.25 -3.2%  $ 57.37 -1.6% 0.98 
16-03-15 $ 61.19 -2.3%  $ 58.32 3.4% 1.03 
09-03-15 $ 62.63 -3.5%  $ 56.41 -1.1% 0.99 
02-03-15 $ 64.87 -4.4%  $ 57.05 -1.8% 0.98 
23-02-15 $ 67.84 -0.7%  $ 58.12 -0.2% 1.00 
17-02-15 $ 68.31 2.6%  $ 58.21 0.9% 1.01 
09-02-15 $ 66.59 4.9%  $ 57.67 2.1% 1.02 
02-02-15 $ 63.48 0.6%  $ 56.47 2.5% 1.03 
26-01-15 $ 63.11 1.0%  $ 55.08 -1.8% 0.98 
20-01-15 $ 62.49 29.7%  $ 56.07 1.5% 1.02 
12-01-15 $ 48.19 2.4%  $ 55.23 0.0% 1.00 
05-01-15 $ 47.04 -5.6%  $ 55.25 -0.8% 0.99 
29-12-14 $ 49.85 2.6%  $ 55.69 -2.0% 0.98 
22-12-14 $ 48.58 0.0%  $ 56.82 1.2% 1.01 
15-12-14 $ 48.59 1.7%  $ 56.17 2.7% 1.03 
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08-12-14 $ 47.78 -4.7%  $ 54.67 -4.3% 0.96 
01-12-14 $ 50.13 1.2%  $ 57.13 -0.1% 1.00 
24-11-14 $ 49.51 -3.8%  $ 57.17 0.0% 1.00 
17-11-14 $ 51.47 -6.7%  $ 57.18 1.2% 1.01 
10-11-14 $ 55.15 0.5%  $ 56.49 0.5% 1.01 
03-11-14 $ 54.88 -2.2%  $ 56.19 -0.4% 1.00 
27-10-14 $ 56.11 2.0%  $ 56.39 2.6% 1.03 
20-10-14 $ 55.00 7.8%  $ 54.94 3.1% 1.03 
15-10-14 $ 51.01   $ 53.27  1.00 
 
Table 28 | Weighted Average Cost of Capital | 
US-30y Treasury Bond 2.55%  Cost of Debt 3.96% 
Cost of Equity CAPM  Average Corporate Tax 20.00% 
Rm Month 0.66%    
Rm Annual 7.95%  WACC 9.51% 
Rf  2.55%  Terminal Growth rate (Adjustment of +0.50%)  4.85% 
MRP 5.40%    
Beta 1.55  CAGR on Inflation rate  2.1% 
Adjusted Beta 1.37  Real WACC 7.30% 
Re = Rf + B * (MRP) 9.93%  Real Terminal Growth Rate 2.74% 
 
Table 29 | Netflix's Perpetuity Growth Model | 
 
 As of December 31 
In millions 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 
UFCF (1,254) (312) 990 1,609 2,660 2,448 
 
Perpetuity Growth Model 
WACC 7.30%  Debt 2016 3,371 
PV                        5,598   Cash 2016 1,461 
Global Terminal Growth 2.74%  Equity Value 55,082 
Terminal Value                      55,147   Shares Outstanding 2016 438.65 
PV Terminal Value                      51,394   Target Share Price $ 125.57 
Enterprise Value                      56,992   Share Price at 14/10/2016 $ 101.47 
   Upside Potential +23.75% 
 
Table 30 | Cash Spent in Contents as a % of Revenues | 
 
 As of December 31  
In millions of dollars 2014 2015 Average 
Cash Spent in Contents 59.1% 69.1% 64.1% 
Absolute value 3,255 4,687  
 
 As of December 31  
In millions of dollars 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Average 
Cash Spent in Contents 77.5% 70.0% 60.0% 60.0% 60.0% 60.0% 64.6% 






Table 31 | Domestic Streaming Segment | 
 
 As of December 31 
In millions of dollars 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 
Revenues Growth  20.0% 15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 1.0% 0.0% 
Estimated Revenues in Domestic Streaming 5,016 5,769 6,346 6,663 6,730 6,730 
Growth in Paid Memberships 10.39% 8.00% 6.00% 4.00% 3.00% 2.50% 
Total Expected Paid Memberships 47.91 51.74 54.85 57.04 58.75 60.22 
Annual ARPU $104.70 $111.49 $115.70 $116.81 $114.54 $111.75 
Monthly ARPU $8.73 $9.29 $9.64 $9.73 $9.55 $9.31 
Growth in Monthly Subscription Fee 8.7% 6.5% 3.8% 1.0% -1.9% -2.4% 
 
 
Table 32 | International Streaming Segment | 
 
 As of December 31 
In millions of dollars 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 
Revenues Growth 55.0% 45.0% 35.0% 25.0% 15.0% 10.0% 
Estimated Revenues in International Streaming 3,028 4,390 5,927 7,409 8,520 9,372 
Growth in Paid Memberships 50.12% 30.00% 20.00% 12.50% 10.00% 10.00% 
Total Expected Paid Memberships 41.19 53.55 64.26 72.29 79.52 87.47 
Annual ARPU $73.51 $81.99 $92.24 $102.49 $107.15 $107.15 
Monthly ARPU $6.13 $6.83 $7.69 $8.54 $8.93 $8.93 
Growth in Monthly Subscription Fee 3.3% 11.5% 12.5% 11.1% 4.5% 0.0% 
 
 
Table 33 | Domestic DVD Segment | 
 
 As of December 31 
In millions of dollars 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 
Revenues Growth  -16.0% -14.0% -12.0% -10.0% -9.0% -8.0% 
Estimated Revenues in Domestic DVD 542 466 411 369 336 309 
Growth in Paid Memberships -16.00% -12.00% -10.00% -9.00% -7.00% -5.00% 
Total Expected Paid Memberships 4.021 3.539 3.185 2.898 2.695 2.560 
Annual ARPU $135 $132 $129 $127 $125 $121 
Monthly ARPU $11.24 $10.99 $10.74 $10.62 $10.40 $10.07 















OTHER FORECAST DETAILS 
 
Table 34 | Forecast Details | 
 As of December 31 
  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 
Revenues Growth NA 13% 21% 26% 23% 27% 24% 19% 14% 8% 5% 
 
Gross Profit Margin 
36% 27% 29% 32% 32% 33% 35% 37% 39% 40% 41% 
 
Marketing Expenses  
(As a % of Revenues) 
13% 13% 11% 11% 12% 11% 10% 7% 7% 7% 7% 
 
Technology and Dev.  
(As a % of Revenues) 
8% 9% 9% 9% 10% 10% 8% 6% 6% 6% 6% 
 
General and Administrative  
(As a % of Revenues) 
4% 4% 4% 5% 6% 6% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 
 
EBIT Margin 
12% 1% 5% 7% 5% 7% 13% 20% 22% 24% 25% 
 
Interest Rate on Borrowing 
5% 5% 6% 6% 6% 7% 7% 7% 8% 8% 8% 
 
Long-term debt 
400 400 500 886 2,371 3,371 4,171 4,171 4,171 4,171 4,106 
 
Other Income/Expense  
(on EBIT) 
-1% -1% 12% 1% 10% 10% 8% 4% 1% 2% 1% 
 
Tax Rate 
37% 43% 34% 24% 14% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 
 
Cash & Cash Equivalents  
(As a % of Revenues) 
 
16% 8% 14% 20% 27% 17% 14% 18% 23% 38% 47% 
Short-Term Investments  
(As a % of Revenues) 
9% 13% 14% 9% 7% 5% 6% 5% 6% 5% 6% 
 
Change in Short-Term Investments 
NA 168 138 (101) 6 (72) 208 (3) 232 (87) 205 
 
Other Current Assets  
(As a % of Revenues) 
4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
 
Other Non-Current Assets  
(As a % of Revenues) 
2% 2% 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 
Account Payables Days 16 12 13 20 20 20 20 25 25 30 30 
 
Other Non-Current Liabilities  
(As a % of Revenues) 
2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
 
Accrued Expenses  
(As a % of Revenues) 
2% 1% 1% 1% 2% 3% 4% 3% 4% 5% 6% 
 
Deferred Revenues  
(As a % of Revenues) 
5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 6% 6% 6% 7% 8% 
 
Purchases of Property & Equipment  
(As a % of Revenues) 
 
2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Amortization of Contents 796 1,657 2,193 2,728 3,485 4,753 5,722 6,342 7,535 8,501 8,562 
Streaming Amortization %  
on Total Amortization 
88% 96% 97% 97% 98% 98% 98% 98% 99% 99% 99% 
 
DVD Amortization %  
on Total Amortization 
12% 4% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 
 
Cash Spent in Contents 
945 1,802 2,423 3,255 4,687 6,655 7,438 7,610 8,665 9,352 9,847 
 
Acquisition of DVD Cont. /  
Cash Spent in Cont. 
9% 3% 3% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
 
Additions to Streaming Cont. Assets Growth 
NA 8% 20% 24% 53% 35% 10% 10% 5% 3% 0% 
 
Principal Payments of Lease Financing 
Obligations (As a % of Revenues) 
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 
New Shares Issued (millions) 
- 52 (11) 7 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Paid-In Capital per Share $0.57 $0.69 $1.83 $ - $ - $1.83 $1.83 $1.83 $1.83 $1.83 $1.83 
Book Value per Share $1.7 $1.7 $3.1 $4.3 $5.1 $5.6 $7.3 $11.1 $15.8 $21.5 $27.8 
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GLOBAL INTERNET PHENOMENA REPORT 
 
Source: 2016 Sandvine’s Global Internet Phenomena, Africa, Asia-Pacific and Middle East and 2016 Sandvine Global 
Internet Phenomena, Latin America & North America 
 
Table 35 | Top 10 Peak Period Applications in North America, Fixed Access | 
 
Table 36 | Top 10 Peak Period Applications in North America, Mobile Access | 
 
  






Table 38 | Top 10 Peak Period Applications in Latin America, Mobile Access | 
 
 











Table 41 | Top 10 Peak Period Applications in Asia-Pacific, Fixed Access | 
 
 
Table 42 | Top 10 Peak Period Applications in Asia-Pacific, Mobile Access | 
 
 







Table 44 | Description of the applications above |  
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52 Wk 52 weeks  
Adm. Administrative 
ARPU Annual Revenue per User 
B/S Balance Sheet 
ß Beta 
BCG Boston Consulting Group 
CAGR Compound Annual Growth Rate 
Cap. Capitalization 
CCO Chief Content Officer 
CEO  Chief Executive Officer 
CFO Chief Financial Officer / Cash Flow from Operations 
CMO Chief Marketing Officer 
Cont. Contents 
CPO Chief Product Officer 
D&A Depreciations & Amortizations 
DCF Discounted Cash Flow 
Dev. Development 
Div. Dividend 
DVD Digital Video Disc 
DVR Device Video Record 
EBIT Earnings Before Interests and Taxes 
EMBA Executive Master of Business Administration 
EPS Earnings Per Share 
EY Ernest & Young 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
HBO Home Box Office 
i. e.  That is 
IMDb Internet Movie Data base 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
Inc. Incorporated 
ISEG Lisbon School of Economics & Management 
JD Juris Doctor 
Kd Cost of Debt 
Ke Cost of Equity 
M.P.P. Master of Public Policy 




MRPU Monthly Revenue per User 
MSc Master of Science 
MSCI ACWI Morgan Stanley Capital International - All Country World Index 
NA Not Applicable 
OTT Over-The-Top 
Out. Outstanding 
pp. Percentage Points 
Prof. Professor 
Qx Quarter 1, 2, 3 or 4 
Re Cost of Equity  
Rf Risk-free Rate 
Rm Market Return 
ROA Return On Assets 
ROCE Return On Capital Employed 
ROE Return On Equity 
SPP Streaming Partners Program 
SVoD Streaming Video on Demand 
SWOT Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats  
TV Television 
Tx Corporate Tax 
UFCC Unlevered Free Cash Flow 
US United States of America 
USD United States Dollar 
USD xxx b United States Dollars xxx Billions 
USD xxx m United States Dollars xxx Millions 
VoD Video on Demand 
W/C Working Capital Changes 
WACC Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
Wd Debt Weight 
We Equity Weight 
WEO World Economic Outlook 
YE Year Ended 
